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Abstract
This dissertation studies two important dimensions of family life in contemporary India, marriage partner
selection and female seclusion, using three different data sources: 48 interviews with the middle-class in
New Delhi, panel survey data from the India Human Development Survey, and survey data from the Center
for the Advanced Study of India Delhi National Capital Region Survey. The first half of this dissertation
sheds light on attitudes towards and the processes involved in arranged marriage among the urban
middle class. The young people interviewed approach marriage decision-making with marital
pragmatism, framing their choices in terms of risks, uncertainties, and costs. Most describe arranged
marriage as the safer option due to the support that these relationships receive from parents. Despite a
strong preference for arranged marriage, interviews revealed significant hybridization between arranged
and self-choice or “love” marriage. Couples in arranged marriages often engaged in courtship during their
engagement. Furthermore, new survey data suggests that many families are willing to call off a wedding
if the betrothed find themselves to be incompatible during their engagement, revealing the family’s
prioritization of choice and compatibility for the couple. The second half of this dissertation examines
patterns of female seclusion and attitudes towards women’s careers. Analysis of panel data shows that
women from households which became wealthier reported increased restrictions on their physical
mobility and greater odds of practicing head-covering or purdah. These findings suggest that the
upwardly mobile may be using female seclusion as a way to signal household status. Dual earner
professional couples in India challenge male breadwinner norms through their division of labor. Men who
married working women mostly report that they were actively searching for an employed wife on the
marriage market because of the financial security that a second income could provide. In addition, to
some respondents, dual earning was believed to help facilitate a companionate marriage. This
dissertation highlights the role of family, economic precarity, risk, and social norms in shaping marriage
and family life in India.
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ABSTRACT
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN INDIA
Megan Nicole Reed
Emily C Hannum
This dissertation studies two important dimensions of family life in contemporary India,
marriage partner selection and female seclusion, using three different data sources: 48
interviews with the middle-class in New Delhi, panel survey data from the India Human
Development Survey, and survey data from the Center for the Advanced Study of India
Delhi National Capital Region Survey. The first half of this dissertation sheds light on
attitudes towards and the processes involved in arranged marriage among the urban middle
class. The young people interviewed approach marriage decision-making with marital
pragmatism, framing their choices in terms of risks, uncertainties, and costs. Most describe
arranged marriage as the safer option due to the support that these relationships receive
from parents. Despite a strong preference for arranged marriage, interviews revealed
significant hybridization between arranged and self-choice or “love” marriage. Couples in
arranged marriages often engaged in courtship during their engagement. Furthermore, new
survey data suggests that many families are willing to call off a wedding if the betrothed find
themselves to be incompatible during their engagement, revealing the family’s prioritization
of choice and compatibility for the couple. The second half of this dissertation examines
patterns of female seclusion and attitudes towards women’s careers. Analysis of panel data
shows that women from households which became wealthier reported increased restrictions
on their physical mobility and greater odds of practicing head-covering or purdah. These
findings suggest that the upwardly mobile may be using female seclusion as a way to signal
vi

household status. Dual earner professional couples in India challenge male breadwinner
norms through their division of labor. Men who married working women mostly report that
they were actively searching for an employed wife on the marriage market because of the
financial security that a second income could provide. In addition, to some respondents, dual
earning was believed to help facilitate a companionate marriage. This dissertation highlights
the role of family, economic precarity, risk, and social norms in shaping marriage and family
life in India.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines two unique features of the Indian family system, arranged
marriage and gender segregation, and, in doing so, makes important contributions to family
sociology and demography. Most countries which have traditionally practiced arranged
marriage have seen significant declines in the prevalence of this practice over the past
century (Ghimire et al. 2006; Malhotra 1991; Matsukura, Retherford, and Ogawa 2011;
Nedoluzhko and Agadjanian 2015; Riley 1994; Thornton, Chang, and Lin 1994). India is an
outlier in that arranged marriage shows limited evidence of decline (Allendorf and Pandian
2016). The first part of this dissertation focuses on arranged marriage and how those in the
urban middle class think about and practice arranged marriage. India is also an outlier in its
low rate of female labor force participation and the widespread prevalence of ideals of
gender segregation (Desai and Andrist 2010; Lahoti and Swaminathan 2016). The second
part of the dissertation shifts the focus to gender dynamics within married couples including
the practice of female seclusion and attitudes towards women’s careers.
The four empirical chapters of this dissertation employ a variety of different
methods. The findings are based on data from 48 interviews with middle-class people living
in the New Delhi metro region, survey data from the 2016 Center for the Advanced Study of
India Delhi National Capital Region Survey, and panel survey data from two waves of the
nationally representative India Human Development Survey (2004-5 and 2011-12). The first
part of the dissertation, comprising of Chapters 2 and 3, draws primarily on interviews with
the urban middle class to study attitudes towards and practices within arranged marriage.
The second part of this dissertation, comprising of Chapters 4 and 5, examines patterns of
1

female seclusion and attitudes towards the male breadwinner ideal from both a macro
perspective using survey data and a micro-perspective through interviews with dual earner
professional couples. Chapter 6 concludes and discusses the key themes of the dissertation.
Arranged and love marriage among the urban middle class
Though India is home to the largest number of arranged marriages in the world, it has
received limited attention in the sociological literature on arranged marriage and less
attention than smaller societies such as Nepal and Taiwan (Ahearn 2001; Allendorf 2017;
Allendorf and Thornton 2015; Thornton et al. 1994). Both of those societies have
experienced a sharp decline in arranged marriage, while India has not. This hints at one
possible reason why India shows up less in the literature. On many indicators, it appears as
though little change is happening to marriage within India. India has extremely low and
stable rates of divorce and intermarriage (Dommaraju 2016; Goli, Singh, and T.V. 2013). In
addition, self-selection of one’s marriage partner, called love marriage in India, constitutes
less than 10% of all marriages in the most recent marriage cohorts, reflecting only a small
increase over several decades (Allendorf and Pandian 2016). These demographic facts aside,
a more complex picture emerges from recent qualitative research on Indian marriages
implying a need for more investigation. For example, Fuller and Narasimhan (2008) finds
that young people in South India are often deeply involved in selecting their arranged
marriage partner. When survey respondents are given the option to indicate the role they
played in arranging their own marriage, the statistics change and reflect a sharp decline in
“parent-only” arranged marriage since the 1970s (Allendorf and Pandian 2016). This
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suggests that the definition of arranged marriage is expanding as young people play a greater
role in selecting their marriage partner.
Th first part of this dissertation builds on this literature and fills in gaps in our
understanding of family formation processes in the Indian context. By using interviews, I am
able to shed light on dimensions of marriage not captured well in existing survey data such
as how young people feel about arranged and love marriage. I supplement these findings
with new data from an original attitudinal survey. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the marriage
experiences and attitudes of the urban middle-class in India’s largest metro, New Delhi. The
middle class has grown recently due to rapid economic growth and the liberalization of the
Indian economy which brought new jobs in the global service sector, access to foreign
media, and new forms of middle-class consumption to India’s metros (Kapur 2017). Chapter
2 seeks to understand how middle-class young adults think about arranged and love marriage
and why they often prefer arranged marriage. I find that young people approach marriage
decision-making with marital pragmatism, focusing on the risks, uncertainties, and costs
associated with different options. Many decide against a love marriage because of the social
stigma attached to it as well as the fact that they perceive that it will lead to less parental
support after marriage. Chapter 2 illuminates how family relationships and social norms
constrain young people’s marriage choices. These findings help provide context for the
pattern of persistence of arranged marriage.
Next, I turn to arranged marriage itself. Two-thirds of Indian women married in the
2000s report that they played some role in deciding their arranged marriage partner, a
phenomenon that Allendorf and Pandian (2016) call “joint arranged” marriage. Researchers
3

still have a limited understanding of what joint-arrangement actually looks like in practice.
Chapter 3 aims to fill this gap by examining how families expand the definition of arranged
marriage to incorporate new elements of choice and compatibility. I find that the marriage
engagement period is an important site for the hybridization of arranged and love marriage.
Interviews with middle class young adults reveal that couples in arranged marriages engage in
courtship during their engagement. New survey data suggests that many in New Delhi are
open to breaking off an engagement if, during their engagement, the couple find themselves
to be incompatible.
Female seclusion, class mobility, and women’s careers
Female labor force participation rates are low in India; however, they are especially low for
married women (Deshpande and Kabeer 2019; Deshpande and Singh 2021; Fletcher, Pande,
and Moore 2018). The majority of Indian households appear to follow a traditional male
breadwinner model with married women kept out of the labor force. The
underrepresentation of women in the Indian labor force is also related to the practice of
female seclusion, a system of gender differentiation and segregation common in South Asia.
Female seclusion may include veiling or head covering (sometimes known as purdah),
restrictions on the physical mobility of women, the gendering of spaces (both within and
outside of the home), and the withdrawal of women from the public sphere and the labor
force (Derne 1995; Jacobsen 1982; Miller 1982; Papanek 1982). These gendered practices are
widespread and found across India’s diverse communities. For example, nearly 60% of
Indian households report practicing some form of veiling or purdah (Desai and Andrist
2010). Culturally, however, female seclusion is associated with higher status communities
4

which can afford to forgo women’s paid labor (Amin 1997; Still 2011; Vatuk 1982). This
pattern is akin to the breadwinner housewife family model in Western societies which has
historically been associated with high status urban, white, and bourgeois families (Folbre
1991; Glenn 2002; Pfau-Effinger 2004).
The second part of this dissertation focuses on female seclusion and the male
breadwinner ideal in India. Chapter 4 examines female seclusion and social class mobility
from a macro perspective using nationally representative panel survey data. This chapter
seeks to understand how household economic mobility impacts the practice of female
seclusion in the household. Fixed effect regression models reveal that women from
households which become wealthier between survey waves faced greater restrictions on their
physical mobility and a higher probability of practicing purdah and withdrawing from the
labor force. Upwardly mobile households may be drawing from the cultural script of status
through female seclusion to perform their newly achieved economic status. Stratified
analyses show that the patterns of mobility-induced female seclusion were primarily found in
rural areas, among the less-educated, and in poorer communities. Urban and higher-status
groups by caste, class, and education were not found to increase their practice of female
seclusion with upward mobility suggesting that they may not see female seclusion as a
marker of status.
Chapter 5 shifts the focus to the small population of dual breadwinning households
within the urban middle class. Despite overall low rates of female work participation in
India, high-skilled Indian women have increasing rates of employment, especially within the
globalized Information Technology (IT) and financial services sectors (Datta Gupta, Nandy,
5

and Siddhanta 2020). Using interview data, this chapter sheds light on the attitudes and
experiences of dual earner professional couples, specifically their attitudes towards male
breadwinner ideals and how they negotiate household and care work responsibilities. Men
who married working women report that they were actively searching for a working wife
because of the greater financial security of dual earner households. Countering breadwinner
ideals, many men and women argue that working women make better partners because they
are better able to relate to their husband and therefore can better establish a companionate
marriage. Despite their openness towards women’s careers, much of housework and care
work remains feminized in dual earner households with much of the work outsourced to
other female household members and female domestic workers.

6

CHAPTER 2: “MARRIAGE IS A COMPLETE GAMBLE”: MARRIAGE
ATTITUDES OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN NEW DELHI
Abstract
Arranged marriage has declined dramatically since the mid-20th century in most countries
where it was historically practiced. India is an outlier to this trend. There is little evidence of
a decline in either the prevalence or popularity of arranged marriage in India. This study
examines the attitudes of middle-class young adults towards marriage using data from 40
interviews conducted in New Delhi. Middle-class young adults were found to approach
marriage with marital pragmatism, centering risks, uncertainty, and costs in their description
of their preferences. To most young people interviewed, arranged marriage was the viewed
as the “safest” option because parental support for the marriage could serve as a form of
insurance in the event of marital problems. Self-selection of one’s marriage partner, also
known as “love marriage,” was less popular because of the steep social costs that are
believed to accompany it including social stigma and less parental support. The findings
highlight the centrality of the family and the normative context in determining marriage
choices.
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Arranged marriage, where parents or other kin select their children’s marriage partner, has
long attracted the attention of sociologists, especially those seeking to understand why this
practice occurs in some cultural contexts, mostly in Asia and Africa, but not others. Since
the middle of the 20th century, arranged marriage has declined in many countries where it
was historically practiced including Japan (Matsukura et al. 2011), China (Riley 1994), Taiwan
(Thornton et al. 1994), Kyrgyzstan (Nedoluzhko and Agadjanian 2015) Nepal (Ghimire et al.
2006), and Indonesia (Malhotra 1991). Over the past several decades, the sociological
literature on arranged marriage has been dominated by two theoretical perspectives that
attempt to describe the conditions that lead to the decline of arranged marriage. The first
theoretical perspective, sometimes referred to as a Modernization Theory view, posits that
macro-structural changes such as urbanization, economic development, and industrialization
weaken the family structures that support arranged marriage and lead to an eventual decline
in the practice (Goode 1963, 1982). A second approach argues that the spread of cultural
schemas about the “modern family” is a main driver of the decline of arranged marriage.
Exposure to normative beliefs about which types of family structures are “good” and
“modern,” referred to as Developmental Idealism in the literature, occurs through
colonialism, mass media, missionaries, international development aid, and schools (Thornton
2005). Both of these theoretical perspectives have been successfully applied to describe the
decline of arranged marriage across a wide range of settings (Allendorf 2017; Allendorf and
Thornton 2015; Hoelter, Axinn, and Ghimire 2004; Kavas and Thornton 2013; Lai and
Thornton 2015; Malhotra 1991; Nedoluzhko and Agadjanian 2015; Thornton and Fricke
1987).
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India, the country with the largest number of arranged marriages, presents a puzzle
in this literature because it seems to belie both theoretical perspectives. Arranged marriage
remains persistent in India despite the country experiencing massive economic and cultural
changes. Nearly 90% of Indian marriages in the 2000s were either arranged or semi-arranged
(Allendorf and Pandian 2016). The rate of self-selection of one’s marriage partner, called
“love marriage” in the Indian context, constitutes less than 10% of marriages and has only
increased by a few percentage points since the 1970’s (Allendorf and Pandian 2016). Studies
of attitudes towards marriage show that arranged marriage is extremely popular in India,
much preferred to self-selection of one’s marriage partner (Donner 2016; Netting 2010;
Reed 2021; Twamley 2013b).
The persistence of arranged marriage is surprising given the other social and
economic transformations that have occurred in Indian society in the past several decades.
Over the past forty years, India has experienced rapid urbanization (Ren 2018), a decline in
the agricultural labor force (Mehrotra and Parida 2017), massive expansion of education,
especially for women (Lin, Desai, and Chen 2020), and a high rate of economic growth
(Basu and Maertens 2007). Each of these indicators could be considered a predictor of the
decline of arranged marriage. India’s colonial history, expansive education system, and
widespread access to Western media would also point to the idea that most Indians have
extensive exposure to Developmental Idealism. Qualitative research has found evidence of
exposure to and endorsement of Developmental Idealism in rural India (Allendorf 2013).
Understanding India’s outlier status in the persistence of arranged marriage is an
important sociological question that I tackle with this study. Drawing on 40 interviews with
9

middle class young adults in New Delhi, I aim to understand how young people make sense
of their marriage options and why the preferred option for most is arranged marriage. I
focus on the middle-class residing in the New Delhi metro region because this population is
most exposed to globalized narratives on love and marriage.
I find that the urban middle class primarily frame their marriage decision-making
through a lens of what I call marital pragmatism. In interviews, young people argue that their
preferences reflect the most pragmatic choice given their assessment of the risks,
uncertainties, and costs associated with different options. Marital pragmatism is a response
to the social environment in which young people make marriage decisions including the
social norms and taboos present in society which limit the desirability of various options
such as love marriage. More important than young people’s own attitudes and beliefs about
marriage are the attitudes of their parents and those of their wider community. Parental
attitudes and community norms moderate the costs associated with love marriage, making it
more or less desirable to young people. The language of marital pragmatism reflects how
young people grapple with competing desires for individual fulfillment in their marriage and
the expectations of their parents and community.
Marriage in contemporary Indian society
Young adults’ views on marriage are shaped by their social context. The norms in their
community impact the availability and costs associated with different options regarding
when they get married, who they can marry, and how they find their marriage partner. For
example, in India marriage is seen as necessary and most Indians will remain with their first
marriage partner for the remainder of their lives. Less than 2% of Indians are never married
10

by the time they reach their early 40’s (IIPS & ICF 2017). Divorce and separation are also
rare and come with significant stigma. Research suggests that only 2% of marriages in India
will end in a divorce or separation within 20 years of marriage (Dommaraju 2016).
The majority of marriages in India today are arranged. Parent-arranged marriage has
long been practiced in India and is built into the kinship structures of Indian families (Karve
1968). Self-selection of one’s marriage partner, where the marriage is preceded by a romantic
relationship, remains an uncommon route to marriage for most Indians. Only about 6% of
couples married in the 2000’s were classified as love marriages compared to 3% of those
married in the 1970’s (Allendorf and Pandian 2016). Though this reflects a doubling in the
rate of love marriage, it still constitutes a very small share of the population.
Love marriage is seen as transgressive in Indian society because it breaches taboos
on dating and often breaks endogamy norms. In much of South Asia, dating is taboo and
there are especially negative reputational consequences for women and girls who engage in
premarital romantic relationships (Aengst 2014; Huang 2018). As a result, most couples
conceal their relationship from their family and sometimes even friends. Non-marital
cohabitation, known in India as a “live-in” relationship, is uncommon and couples who wish
to cohabit must contend with discrimination from landlords. These stigmas may even carry
over to married life for couples who found each other through dating. Women who marry
through love marriages report facing heightened social scrutiny and receive less sympathy
from the community if they encounter marital problems (Grover 2018; Mody 2002).
One function of arranged marriage in Indian society is to ensure the maintenance of
endogamy or marrying within one’s community. Despite small increases since the 1980s,
11

only about 6% of marriages between 2001 and 2005 were inter-caste and only 2% crossed
the barriers of religion (Goli et al. 2013). Attitudinal surveys indicate significant opposition
to intermarriage in India. Roughly two-thirds of Indians say that it is very important to stop
people from marrying outside of their religion and caste (Pew Research Center 2021). This
view is not restricted to rural areas. As many as 40% of people in the Delhi metro support
laws prohibiting inter-caste marriage (Coffey et al. 2018). Less than 5% of people in the
Delhi region reported that their family would accept inter-marriage by caste (jati), language,
religion, or social class (Reed 2021). Couples in inter-religious and inter-caste love marriages
often face violence and disownment due to their choice of marriage partner (Chowdhry
2010; Mody 2008).
While love marriage remains uncommon, young people are playing an increasing role
in selecting their marriage partner within the structure of arranged marriage. Recently,
researchers have begun using the term “joint-arranged marriage” to describe marriages that
fall somewhere in between love and arranged. Survey data suggests that an increasing share
of the population describe their marriage in this way. Of those married in the 1970’s, about
half describe their marriage as joint arranged, compared to two-thirds of marriages in the
2000’s (Allendorf and Pandian 2016). The literature is unclear about how joint-arranged
marriage works in most families but recent survey data from the New Delhi region suggests
that, for most families, joint-arranged marriage means that parents select their child’s spouse
but that young people are allowed to “veto” options, often after meeting or speaking with
the potential match a few times (Reed 2021). This type of joint-arranged marriage modifies
arranged marriage to incorporate some degree of choice for young people but stops short of
altering the centrality of parents in the process. Another type of “joint-arranged” marriage
12

occurs when couples in a romantic relationship seek their parents’ blessing to marry to avoid
the stigmatizing option of elopement. If the couple is successful in getting the support of
both sets of parents, they sometimes proceed forward with the wedding plans as though it
were a fully arranged marriage (Donner 2016; Uberoi 2006). This is sometimes referred to as
a “love-cum-arranged” marriage or “arranged love marriage.” With these practices middle
class families are contributing to the increasingly fuzzy boundary between love and arranged
marriage (Fuller and Narasimhan 2008).
Despite evidence of hybridizing marriage practices in India today, arranged and love
marriage continue to serve as two competing cultural scripts in the public discourse. In
explaining and rationalizing their choices, young people draw from marriage scripts as
conceptual devices to make sense of their decisions (Swidler 2001). In social discourse, love
marriage is often negatively associated with a “corrupted” Western family culture and is seen
to lead to higher probability of divorce and marital unhappiness (Derné 2005; Mody 2008;
Netting 2010; Twamley 2013a). In previous studies, young Indians were often found to
speak negatively about love marriage while at the same time advocating for individual choice
within arranged marriage or emphasizing romantic compatibility within their arranged
matches (Netting 2010; Twamley 2013b). Thus, while many young Indians want a jointarranged marriage, they reject the language of “love marriage” due to its association with
taboo Western dating and family practices.
Data and methods
Data for this study comes from 40 semi-structured interviews with college-educated men
and women ranging in age from 18 to 35 who reside in the New Delhi metro region.
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Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Hindi and/or English between July 2018 and
March 2019. The average length of an interview was an hour. There were two phases of data
collection, each with a separate sub-population providing a different lens on the marriage
process. In the first phase during summer 2018, I interviewed unmarried young people who
were approaching the age of marriage. In the second phase, during spring 2019, I
interviewed recently married or engaged individuals from 16 different-sex couples.
Interviewing both those anticipating their marriage and those recently married provided a
complete perspective on young people’s attitudes during different stages of the marriage
decision-making process. I used a semi-structured interview guide for the interviews but
allowed significant latitude for interviewees to bring in related topics or take the
conversation in new directions. Unmarried people were asked how they expected to find
their spouse, what they thought about arranged and love marriage, and what they would look
for in a marriage partner, among other topics. Recently married or engaged individuals were
asked about their relationship history, the details of how they and/or their family found their
marriage partner, and how things had been going since the wedding.
The criteria for participation in the study were that the respondent should be
between the ages of 18 and 35, reside in the Delhi metro region, and have at least a
bachelor’s degree (or currently be pursuing a degree). I utilized a combination of different
recruiting strategies to reach a diverse group of individuals. The unmarried respondents were
recruited through cold-calling households which had participated in a 2016 survey based on
a representative sample of the Delhi National Capital Region. In addition, some unmarried
respondents were recruited through approaching college students near a local campus. In the
second wave of data college, recently married or engaged respondents were recruited using
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recruiting text messages shared on the Whatsapp messaging app as well as recruiting posts in
closed Facebook neighborhood groups. Respondents were also recruited by snowballing
from previous respondents’ contacts. I targeted recruitment of couples who had been
married or engaged within the past 4 years. No financial incentives were given for
participation in the study; but, in the second phase of data collection, married or engaged
respondents were thanked for their time with a small gift package of chocolates. Interviews
took place either in the home of the respondent or in a public location, most commonly a
coffee shop. A local female research assistant attended each interview with the author and
participated in the interview questioning. All interviews were audio recorded except one and
fieldnotes were also taken to document contextual details from the interviews.
Ten interviews were conducted during the first phase, with six being individual
interviews and the remaining four being small group interviews. Small group interviewing is
especially useful in revealing how meaning is co-constructed within a group (Bjørnholt and
Farstad 2014; Reczek 2014). While these interviews took on a slightly different dynamic than
the individual interviews, they also provided valuable insights into how young people spoke
with each other about their views on marriage. The small group interviews in this study
included a group of brothers, a group of sisters, and two groups of female friends. The 17
young people interviewed during the first phase of data collection ranged in age from 18 to
29 and half were women.
In the second phase of data collection, thirty recently married or engaged people
were interviewed, including 16 women and 14 men from 16 couples. Two of the husbands
refused participation in the study. All married and engaged individuals were interviewed
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alone and separate from their spouse. Five of the 16 couples described their marriage as an
arranged love marriage whereas the other 11 couples described their marriage as arranged or
semi-arranged. One couple was engaged and had not yet had their wedding. The rest of the
couples had been married within the past four years, most within a year of the interview.
Five of the couples already had a child together. The married and engaged respondents
ranged in age from 23 to 35.
This study aimed to examine the views of the urban middle class, which was defined
as having or working towards completing a higher education degree and residing in the Delhi
metro region. All of the married respondents had at least a bachelor’s degree and many had
the equivalent of a graduate or professional degree. Half of the unmarried respondents were
full-time college students. Five interviewees were unemployed at the time of the interview.
Most of those who were employed had professional occupations in management, business,
medicine, government/law, and information technology. Others worked in service or
administrative jobs including customer service, teaching, and tutoring. A high proportion of
the married couples were dual earner (12 out of 16 couples).
The interview respondents came from a diverse array of castes and religions which
are represented in the urban middle-class of New Delhi. While the majority of respondents
were Hindu, seven of the individuals followed the Sikh religion, four were Jains, and two
were Muslims. The majority of Hindus interviewed were upper castes, but seven
interviewees were members of government-categorized “Other Backward Classes” (OBC) or
Dalit (oppressed castes) communities. Though marriage practices vary across India’s
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different caste and religious groups, arranged marriage is prevalent in all communities. The
findings described in the text did not vary systematically by caste or religion.
The audio data from the interviews was transcribed and translated into English (if it
was in Hindi) by the research assistant who is a fluent Hindi-speaker. The data was analyzed
using ATLAS.ti software. Two waves of coding took place and analytical memos were used
to help re-categorize codes and identify emerging themes and relationships between codes.
First, codes were created around topics or ideas about the marriage arrangement process
drawn from the interview schedule such as “the first meeting,” “ideal qualities of spouse,”
and “pessimism about marriage.” In the second wave of coding, I created a broad list of
codes and sub-codes from the emerging themes which guided my re-reading and re-coding
of the interviews. In the following text, pseudonyms are used for the study participants and
small details, such as place names, have been changed to protect their privacy.
The risk of ending up in a “bad marriage”
Individuals interviewed, especially those who were not yet married, often expressed anxious
feelings about marriage. This anxiety was related to their fear about the risk of ending up in
an unhappy or conflict-ridden marriage. Sumit, a 24-year-old unmarried graduate student,
explained that “after hearing all the stories nowadays…there can be so many disputes after
marriage, whatever the reason might be… so out of a hundred percent, twenty percent of
the time I think about not getting married.” Sumit shared several examples of the “disputes”
that couples can experience using anecdotes from his brother’s and friends’ marriages,
including both love and arranged marriages. Sumit was not alone in recanting stories of
unsuccessful marriages. It was quite common in the interviews for people to tell detailed
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stories of unhappy marriages; about half of those interviewed did so. The stories they shared
about unsuccessful marriages in their social network ranged from infidelity to abandonment
to divorce. Young people interviewed employed these stories didactically as examples of
worst-case scenarios of a negative marriage outcome.
Anxiety about marriage often led young people to delay their marriage as long as
possible. Arun, a young man in his late twenties working in management, had an arranged
marriage two years before our interview. Though currently happily married, he reflected on
his efforts to delay his marriage in his early twenties explaining:
I just didn’t want to give up my life … I was against the idea [of getting
married] … I never realized that it could actually turn out to be this good,
because I think I had seen other marriages, good and bad, so I always was
scared … of having a bad marriage.
Like Sumit, Arun expressed reservation about marriage because of a fear of ending up in a
“bad” marriage. In addition, Arun was concerned about how marriage might impact his
lifestyle, explaining later in the interview that he was afraid that he would not be able to go
out with his friends as much after marriage and that his social “circle would reduce.”
The women interviewed expressed similar anxieties about marriage but with an
added fear that marriage would be disempowering to them due to gender roles and the
burden of household labor. Reena, a 31-year-old woman working in management who had
an arranged marriage a year and a half ago, explained that she delayed her marriage for many
years because of a fear that she would lose her autonomy as a married woman. She detailed
her feelings:
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I had seen so much fighting between my sister and her husband… him
shouting at her and she’s like, ‘okay, this is how it is.’ I’ve seen so many
things and I was like, ‘I don’t want to get married!’… [like] when my father
is angry at my mom and shouting at mom. This was also in my mind that
time, that the girl always must listen to her husband.
Like Sumit and Arun, Reena feared ending up in a marriage filled with conflict. However,
Reena was also concerned that she would be end up in a marriage where her husband would
dominant decision-making. Kavita, an 18-year-old unmarried female college student shared a
similar sentiment about women’s autonomy after marriage:
I’ve fifty percent decided not to marry. Because when you get married, you
get tied down, there are lots of constraints- ‘don’t do this, don’t do that’. If
we don’t get married, we can do anything we want, go wherever we want,
but after marriage it’s all ‘don’t do this, do that’. [Without marriage] you
don’t have to answer to anyone.
Like Arun before his marriage, Kavita focused on how marriage would constrain her life. A
focus on possible risks associated with marriage was an important part of how young people
adopted a pragmatic approach to marriage decision-making.
Marriage as a “gamble”
In addition to a concern regarding risks, young people described marriage decision-making
as fraught with uncertainty and unpredictability. Interview respondents spoke about having
little to no control over whether they would end up in a good or a bad marriage. In over a
quarter of the interviews, young people volunteered words like “gamble” or “luck” to
describe the uncertainty of the marriage decision-making process. Amar, a medical
professional in his early thirties who had an arranged marriage two years before the interview
explained that “marriage is complete gamble…in arranged and love marriage… either you
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win or lose, there is no mid-way. If it’s a hit, it’s a hit. If it’s a flop, it’s a flop.” Amar’s view
of marriage framed it as a dichotomy of winners and losers who have no control over their
fate. This perspective helped him justify his choice to go with the more traditional arranged
marriage option over a love marriage.
To Amar and many people interviewed, the outcomes of both arranged and love
marriages were equally unpredictable. Jyoti, a medical professional who had an arranged
marriage three years prior, shared Amar’s belief that both types of marriage were a “gamble.”
She said, “It’s luck. I have seen people who have been talking for seven or eight years, but
after getting married they have problems because they cannot work together.” From Amar
and Jyoti’s perspective, if dating before marriage did not provide a guarantee that the
marriage would not end up a “flop,” then there was no advantage to love marriage over
arranged.
Many young people felt that the uncertainty of marriage outcomes derives from the
inability to assess compatibility before the wedding. Reena, quoted earlier, shared that:
No matter how much you try to get to know someone, it hardly matters.
When you are going to spend the time with a particular person, and living
day and night with him or her, only then you will get to know each other,
otherwise you won’t know, because meeting for two or three hours or a day
does not allow you to really make a judgement on anybody.
Reena believed that people only show a part of their personality when getting to know a
potential marriage partner, making it impossible to truly anticipate their behavior after
marriage. Navya, a recently married scientist in her early thirties, shared a similar sentiment,
“I can’t make any decision when I met you only once, so for me it’s like - at least you have
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the financial stability… the emotional… that’s the big dice.” Navya went on to explain that
since she felt there was no way to predict the emotional compatibility of the couple in an
arranged marriage beforehand, they would simply have to “adjust” after the wedding. To
Navya, financial security was a more pragmatic basis for a successful marriage than
emotional compatibility and could be ensured through her family’s proper vetting of the
groom’s financial status before fixing the marriage. Emotional compatibility, on the other
hand, was left to the chance of a roll of dice.
There was disagreement regarding whether love marriage was as unpredictable as
arranged marriage. Not all respondents, even those in an arranged marriage, shared the view
of Amar and Jyoti, that love marriage involves the same degree of uncertainty as arranged.
Geeta was an IT professional in her late 20s who had been married for the past year through
in arranged marriage. She said that marriage “depends upon luck, because [someone’s] real
nature you cannot judge…when you start living with him, only then you can judge him, in
any of the case, love or arranged.” However, later in the interview she clarified:
The difference between love and arranged marriage is that, in love
[marriage] you can visualize your future with your partner, but in arranged
it’s all gamble, I didn’t know how his behavior actually would be … you
come to know only after marriage.
To Geeta, the outcome of both love and arranged marriages could be subject to “luck”
however those in love marriages have a better idea of what to expect from their life with
their partner because of their premarital relationship. Geeta’s views on marriage were
influenced by watching her brother’s love marriage which she described as having more
“chemistry” than her own arranged marriage.
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Those who had a love marriage universally felt that it was a less uncertain choice
than arranged marriage. In fact, to them the uncertainty of arranged marriage was the reason
they had decided to opt for a love marriage. Apurva was a 29-year-old working for a media
company who had married her boyfriend of eight years one month prior to our interview.
She explained her views on arranged marriage:
The arranged marriage set-up is such a dubious thing. It’s a total
gamble…the first three or four times you meet someone, you show them
your best, you will never show your flaws… the person I’m married to, he
knows what my worst is and what my best is. He knows all of that. In
arranged marriage it’s like, you never show your worst and … after three or
four meetings you’re expected to answer the question about how you liked
him…you at least need six months to a year, to assess how it is, even
though, according to me, one year is also not enough time.
Most people in arranged marriages interviewed described feeling pressure, as Apurva notes
in her quote, to give an answer of whether they wanted to move forward with the arranged
marriage after very little interaction with their potential marriage partner. To Apurva, what
distinguished her relationship from an arranged marriage was just how well they knew each
other before the wedding. Krishna, a 26-year-old management professional who had married
his girlfriend of three years a few months prior to the interview, shared a similar view on
arranged marriage:
I think love marriage is quite good because …you get to know [each other]
and … take your time to… understand each other, see [each other in] your
comfort zones… and then once you have gotten completely sure, you step
into the marriage… There’s no step back after marriage otherwise you’ll
spoil your lives because divorce is not easy to handle and it affects a lot of
lives- your lives, your parents’ lives as well … I do not believe in arranged
marriage, to be honest, because I want to know the person I’m getting
married to and I want to know her well.
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Both Apurva and Krishna advocated for a long period of dating as a precursor to any
conversation about marriage. Even those who chose a love marriage framed their marriage
decisions using a language of marital pragmatism around the goal of managing uncertainty.
To them, arranged marriage was completely uncertain and love marriage, entered into after
the couple feel ready, provided greater certainty of marriage success.
Love marriage may be less of a “gamble” but comes with costs for some
Costs were another major theme to emerge from the interviews. Some respondents, though
they acknowledged that love marriage was less of a gamble, still chose to go with an arranged
marriage because love marriage would entail social and emotional costs. In making sense of
their options, they weighed the uncertainty against other costs, which might vary depending
on their family situation. This was the primary way in which marital pragmatism led young
people to select an arranged marriage over the choice of love marriage. Madhav, a 26-yearold working in the business sector who had been married through an arranged marriage only
a few months before our interview, felt that arranged marriage was a bigger gamble than love
marriage. However, Madhav was happy that he had taken that risk and opted for an arranged
marriage. He detailed his views:
Arranged is good. It’s like a gamble. Like what life partner you get, you can
get a good life partner, a bad life partner, it depends. But love marriage is
also good, you know each other from the beginning, you know them really
well, and you know that you want to spend your whole life with them. But I
would suggest arranged marriage to people.
Madhav explained that a few years ago he had approached his parents about having a love
marriage to his then-girlfriend of five years, who was from a different religious and caste
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community. His parents rejected the match. In retrospect he was satisfied with his choice to
not move forward with the love marriage without his parents’ support. He described why his
arranged marriage was a better outcome than having married his ex-girlfriend:
The best part is, in this relationship, my parents are happy. They are very
comfortable with her… if I had just gone against them and done [the
marriage to my ex-girlfriend], they would have [accepted it] if I had forced
them a lot, but things wouldn’t be the way they are going on right now in
our family… now they are really very happy, because the marriage is as per
their choice and because they wanted to do it within our community, so
they are really very happy… the first thing for me is that I want my parents
to be happy… comparatively this is better for me [than having a love
marriage].
In Madhav’s case, love marriage would have come at a high social cost in weakened
ties with his parents because of their disapproval of intermarriage and, as he explained, “the
perception in their mind … that love marriage doesn’t work.” To him, it was better to take a
risk on an arranged marriage than face his parents’ disappointment and potentially a lifetime
of family tension. In addition, he felt a strong sense of compatibility with his wife and felt
happy to have ended up in a marriage that made both himself and his parents happy.
Other couples interviewed fought for their love marriage but endured significant
costs from their choice to do so. After twelve years of dating, Sunita, who was trained as a
scientist, and Vinay, who works for a media company, had finally married eight months prior
to our meeting. The college sweethearts faced significant opposition from Sunita’s parents to
their relationship both because it was inter-caste and because of the taboo on dating/love
marriage. Sunita was raised in a low-income neighborhood by conservative parents who had
migrated from a village. Vinay’s family was wealthier and, according to Vinay and Sunita,
“open minded” in outlook, having no opposition to love marriage. Sunita described the
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significant lengths that she and Vinay went to convince her parents to accept the match. This
including inviting Sunita’s mother to Vinay’s home under false pretense where Vinay’s family
staged a dramatic intervention, pleading with her to see the value in the match. In addition,
Vinay’s family offered to pay for all wedding expenses. Sunita explained that:
Running away was never an option… I used to think that if we run away,
what will happen to [my parents]? My father was not very healthy… and
even for my mother [it would be difficult] … No matter what, we would do
it after telling them, we’re not going to run away.
Sunita experienced significant emotional distress during this time thinking about how her
marriage to Vinay could impact her parents’ health or cause them shame in their community.
She was eventually able to convince her parents to accept the marriage partially because they
had been unable to find her a good match on their own. According to Sunita, the primary
obstacle for her parents was a concern about “what people would say” if they told their
extended kin in the village that their daughter had an out-of-caste love marriage. As a result,
Sunita’s parents did not invite any of their extended kin to the wedding and Sunita explained,
“[my mother] told everyone that … we got Sunita married … to someone from our caste
and that the marriage is arranged.” Sunita was uncomfortable with the lie that her mother
had told and worried “how long can we hide it?” Sunita and Vinay’s case reveals the
significant social costs that can come with love marriage for individuals and their families if
they come from a community that is not open to love marriage. Ultimately, Sunita was happy
that her parents had given their support to the marriage, even if they were unable to
confront the community stigma on inter-caste love marriage in her place of origin.
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The situation of Ayesha and Rahul, an inter-religious couple who had a love marriage
four years prior also illustrates the costs of love marriage for some. Ayesha and Rahul, both
29 at the time of the interview, had started dating in middle school but knew that they would
face social disapproval of their relationship because Ayesha was Muslim, and Rahul was
Hindu. Determined to make his relationship with Ayesha work after high school, Rahul
chose to leave their hometown to relocate to New Delhi where he felt he would find more
acceptance of his inter-religious relationship. Ayesha, an artist and entrepreneur, and Rahul,
who worked in business, were able to gain the support of their parents for their marriage
when they finally approached them about it at the age of 23. However, they faced significant
opposition from their neighbors and relatives. Ayesha explained the difficult period:
Things got complicated, and the word of mouth spread. Obviously, people
got to know… There was a lot of chaos … Everybody was upset, except
my parents and one of my uncles… there were other relatives who were
quite upset. [My cousins] actually became obsessed with my marriage. They
tried to kidnap me. They actually planned it that they would not let [me] get
married to a Hindu guy.
Ayesha’s cousins who were plotting to kidnap her so that she would not be able to marry
Rahul eventually gave up on their plan after the intervention of other family members. The
couple was satisfied that they were finally able to achieve their goal of getting married,
something they had been planning for over eight years; however, they acknowledged that
they did bear large costs for their choice. Their marriage had left lingering trauma, including
emotional pain caused when Rahul’s family attempted to forcibly change Ayesha’s name to a
Hindu name, and broken ties with extended family and neighbors who refused to accept the
union. They continued to face discrimination as an interreligious married couple in Delhi.
Rahul explained that:
26

There have been a lot of issues [finding an apartment]. We found a place
and paid the advance as well, but when they asked for our IDs, they realised
that one is a Hindu and one is a Muslim, so they refused [to rent to us].
They ended up losing their advance on that apartment. Rahul and Ayesha’s situation is
extreme because of the huge taboo on marriage between Hindus and Muslims in India.
However, it exemplifies the steep costs that may come with the choice of pursing a love
marriage.
The social and emotional costs to love marriage vary dramatically depending on the
openness of one’s family. Some couples faced fewer costs because they had the support of
their family for their love marriage and their marriage did not cross major boundaries of
caste and religion. Both Krishna and Apurva, mentioned earlier, were able to pursue a love
marriage without the steep social and emotional costs that Sunita, Vinay, Rahul, and Ayesha
did. By getting the full endorsement of their love marriage from their parents, they might
treat their marriage almost as though it were arranged, a process often called an “arranged
love marriage.” Apurva had been open with her parents about her romantic relationship with
her boyfriend Siddharth for several years before they began formally talking about marriage.
Her parents accepted the relationship and encouraged her to marry Siddharth. She explained
that she faced no pressure to have an arranged marriage and her parents were even accepting
of the fact that Siddharth came from a different caste. Siddharth’s family was similarly
supportive of the marriage.
Krishna and Shreya encountered a similar level of support for their love marriage
because of their parent’s attitudes towards marriage. Krishna and his wife Shreya kept their
relationship a secret from their families until they knew they were ready for marriage.
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Krishna explained that “my family is completely open in terms of relationships, so I never
faced any restrictions… so I just told them that I like a girl and I want to get married, and
they were happy with it. It’s your decision, it’s your life, go forward with it.” Krishna and
Shreya’s parents supported the love marriage even though they came from different caste
communities, perhaps because there was no large gap in status between their castes. Because
they were both raised by parents who were open to the idea of self-selection of one’s
marriage partner and because their marriages did not cross large caste or religious barriers,
Apurva and Krishna faced few obstacles to their love marriages. When weighing the costs,
risks, and uncertainties of love and arranged marriage, it was clear to Apurva and Krishna
that love marriage to their long-term romantic partner made the most sense. This calculation
was different for Madhav, whose parents were not accepting of an inter-caste love marriage.
The social context, especially family attitudes, in which young people make marriage
decisions was the most important factor determining the choices they will make.
Arranged marriage as insurance
Despite the view that it may be a “gamble,” arranged marriage remains popular within the
urban middle-class and most of the unmarried respondents favored it over love marriage.
This was because arranged marriage was viewed as coming with an important benefit, family
support. To young people applying a marital pragmatism lens to their choice, this parental
support made arranged marriage a “safer” and more desirable option. Neel, who was married
to Geeta, was a management professional in his early 30s. He explained that:
I think both [types of] marriage are a gamble, whether it is love or arranged.
With arranged, it is more of a gamble, it’s just that you have the backing of
your families. If something goes wrong, the families have an option to
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come into play. With love marriage, I think that option kind of gets reduced
because it is eventually the individual’s decision to get into that kind of
marriage.
Neel’s quote provides an example of the most common reason given by middle-class young
adults for why they prefer arranged marriage. According to him, arranged marriage would
allow him to access more parental support if the marriage did not work out or encountered
issues. Thus, parents serve as a form of insurance against the risk of a “bad marriage” for
those in an arranged marriage. Madhav, who had decided against a love marriage because of
how it would impact his relationship with his parents, shared that:
It’s your call to go for a love marriage, so you can’t complain about your
life partner to your parents, because they did not agree to it, so you can’t
complain or discuss anything if you have any kind of issues going on in
your marriage.
Amar expressed a similar sentiment. He explained that he chose an arranged marriage
“because you have a parental backing, so if anything bad happens to you, or if the marriage
does not work, you have both families’ support behind you… emotional support, financial
support… any type of support you want.” He later explained that some people in love
marriage may get family support but not always and not to the same degree, in his opinion.
Since, as his quote in the previous section reveals, Amar felt that both love and arranged
marriage were a “gamble,” he elected for an arranged marriage because it would come with
this vital insurance.
The unmarried young people interviewed frequently brought up this line of
reasoning as justification for their endorsement of arranged marriage over love marriage.
Sumit, who is quoted earlier expressing a desire to skip marriage altogether, explained why
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he was unable to give a strong promise of marriage to his secret girlfriend, who eventually
ended up having an arranged marriage to someone else:
I, myself, am not prepared for marriage right now… my brother told our
parents [that he wanted a love marriage], but he didn’t force them to agree
… in the end, [parents] have to give in to their child’s demands, but then
they won’t take responsibility for anything, and if something goes wrong in
the future, then whose support do I have, if not my parents? … she asked
me to give her surety that I would marry her, so then she’d be able to stall
her parents, [but] what surety could I give her? I don’t have any myself.
Sumit felt unready for the magnitude of the commitment of marriage to his girlfriend when
her parents began arranging her marriage. Witnessing how his older brother had to take on
more responsibility for his choice since he had a love marriage had left a strong impression
on Sumit, making him wary of such a large commitment. As a result, Sumit felt that he
would go for an arranged marriage instead.
Many of the unmarried young people used a language of “blame” when describing
who would take responsibility for adverse situations in their marriage. They feared that, if
their love marriage encountered problems, they would be “blamed” for having picked a
“bad” partner. Sanjay, a 21-year-old unmarried college student explained that:
When you choose someone, you have to be their guarantor, because you
chose them. If my mother chooses someone, that’s easier, there’s more
scope for compromise. I can blame her. It’s like if I break a mirror, I get
yelled at, but if my mother breaks it, no one says anything.
The parents of Gautam, a 29-year-old unmarried man working in sales, had begun searching
for a wife for him at the time of our interview. He also discussed the role of “blame” in
shaping his views on marriage:
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Arranged is safer… you cannot blame yourself… If I have a love marriage,
they’ll go on and on for my entire life if the girl turns out wrong. If you
have an arranged marriage, then you can be the one to go on and on… tell
them to handle her since they chose her.
It was not only men who spoke about deflecting “blame” for their marriage choices.
Sanjana, a 25-year-old medical student who wanted to marry her secret boyfriend but felt
that her family wouldn’t approve of the inter-caste love marriage had resigned herself to the
probable outcome of an arranged marriage. However, she noted that she would make clear
to her parents that “if I’m having an arranged marriage, if I’m getting married to someone of
your choice, [then] if I have a problem later, you can’t blame me if I leave… the blame
shouldn’t be on me.” While “blame” was a common theme in interviews with unmarried
young people, those who were married rarely spoke about allocating blame and often did not
categorize their marriage partner as wholly bad or good. Those who reported being unhappy
in their arranged marriages generally reported having good relationships with their parents,
primarily directing their frustration at their partner rather than the parents who chose their
marriage partner.
For women, the desire to insure oneself in the event of a “bad marriage” sometimes
took on a specific meaning related to safety. A few women described how women are in a
more vulnerable position in a love marriage relative to an arranged marriage because they
lack the same degree of family support. Kavita explained a hypothetic situation which could
happen in a love marriage:
Later the boy says things to the girl about leaving her family, and can have
any demands later, there’s nothing the girl can do or say, because she chose
this, she didn’t do it with her parent’s permission … If we do something
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with our parents’ permission, then we know they’re there, if the boy
tortures you or something, you can tell your parents, they can help you.
Kavita’s quote suggests that a woman who faces domestic violence after a love marriage
many not be able to return to her parents for support and assistance. Tanvi, a 23-year-old
unmarried schoolteacher, explained that, in an arranged marriage, a young woman can return
to her parents if things go bad in her marital home “because we listened to our parents…so
we can say it’s not working and come back.” Tanvi acknowledged that she had not seen this
happen with anyone in her community but felt confident that her family would have her
back if things went poorly after her wedding.
While having the insurance of parental support was an appealing advantage, some
respondents felt that it was still not enough to compensate for the uncertainty that also
comes with arranged marriage. Tripti, who was married to Amar, was a management
professional in her early thirties. Tripti’s family was, as she described, “liberal” and open to a
love marriage; however, Tripti never had a serious boyfriend in her twenties that she
considered marrying. By the time she was 29, the pressure to get married was overwhelming.
Amar and Tripti were married just 45 days after initially meeting on an online matrimonial
site, only having met three times before the ceremony. She shared:
After marriage… we had this issue with understanding each other… but
fortunately it was an arranged marriage…so it was supported by the
families. But then when you know the guy, when you’ve dated him for
some time, things become easier after marriage.
Tripti agreed that the support of their families was an asset that made adjustment to married
life easier; however, she still felt that it would have been easier to adjust if she had known
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her husband better before the wedding. She contrasted her experience with that of her
younger sister who was engaged to be married to her longtime boyfriend. Because of their
premarital relationship, she did not anticipate her sister having as much trouble adjusting to
married life as she had experienced.
Discussion
India is an outlier compared to other Asian countries in the persistence of arranged marriage.
This study has examined the marriage attitudes of middle-class young adults in New Delhi
and, in doing so, shed light on why arranged marriage remains dominant in India despite
large economic and cultural changes in other dimensions of Indian life. Young Indians
interviewed held strong reservations about marriage, often citing examples of “bad”
marriages around them. The stories shared during the interviews of unhappy or conflictridden marriages in their social circles suggest that these issues may be more widespread than
the literature suggests. Because of taboos on divorce, young people fear becoming trapped in
one of these “bad” marriages. As a result of their concerns about marriage outcomes, the
young Delhi-ites took an approach to marriage which I call marital pragmatism.
The language of marital pragmatism used by the urban middle class is a response to
their desire to balance the competing expectations of their family with their own desire to
have a fulfilling marriage. Given the high stakes of marriage decision-making, young people
spoke through a lens of risks, uncertainties, and costs in justifying their choices. To many
young people, arranged marriage was the “safer” choice because it came with the insurance
of family support and did not suffer from the large costs associated with love marriage
including disappointing parents and social stigma. However, they balanced these advantages
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with the “gamble” of arranged marriage that derives from not really knowing their partner
before marriage. They explained that the risk of incompatibility after marriage would be
more manageable if they had the valuable support of their parents and community, which
could be won only through conforming to the expectations of arranged marriage. What
remains unclear, however, is how this parental support plays out for couples who face
marital issues and whether parental assistance after marriage differs, as respondents believed,
for couples in arranged, semi-arranged, and love marriages. Future research could examine
this issue through focusing on the experiences of couples after marriage.
Those who advocated for love marriage, on the other hand, prioritized reducing
uncertainty of marriage outcomes, sometimes at the expense of social and emotional costs.
In doing so, they argued, they were reducing the risk of ending up in an unhappy marriage.
Cultural narratives in India often describe love marriage as based on hasty and selfish
decisions influenced by lust (Mody 2008; Twamley 2013a). Middle class respondents who
advocated for love marriage challenged these narratives by casting their own decisionmaking through a lens of logic, pragmatism, and careful planning. While the young people
interviewed often categorized marriage as a dichotomy between love and arranged when
discussing their preferences and beliefs, in practice that distinction has grown blurry. Those
couples interviewed who described their marriage as a love marriage did not elope against
their parents’ wishes, as the stereotypical image of love marriage depicts. Instead, they
sought the approval of their parents, seeking to obtain a hybrid “arranged love marriage”
which would be seen publicly as supported by the families. However, the interviews as well
as other literature suggests that these couples may still face some stigma or enjoy less family
support after marriage (Grover 2018; Mody 2008; De Neve 2016). Those in arranged
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marriages also pushed the boundaries, often describing how they tried to reduce uncertainty
about their marriage partner by getting to know them before a decision was finalized and
before the wedding.
The social and normative context plays a constraining role in young people’s life
decisions limiting the set of options which are desirable. Young Indians face a social
expectation that they marry and a taboo on separation which made marriage both
unavoidable and seemingly permanent. Taboos on dating and cohabitation bring logistic
challenges to engaging in premarital romantic relationships. Finally, love marriage comes
with significant social and emotional costs, due to the fact that it remains taboo in most
communities. These social norms serve as hard barriers which circumscribe young people’s
lives and the life options available to them. Importantly, these structural constraints limit the
effect of purely cultural globalization (Derné 2005). Ideational diffusion does not occur in a
vacuum but interacts with local culture and social structures. This study highlights how
normative and family constraints influence the marriage decision-making of the urban
educated middle-class, the group most exposure to global cultural influences such as
Developmental Idealism.
The findings also point to the central role of the family in framing the marriage
options available to young people. This study contributes to a growing literature on how
parents’ marriage attitudes and beliefs impact the marriage behaviors of young people
(Allendorf 2019; Jennings, Axinn, and Ghimire 2012). Preserving good relations with their
parents is of paramount importance to young people and, as this study reveals, shapes the
way that they think about marriage far more than globalized ideals regarding love and
35

“modernity.” Indeed, many of the respondents had decided against a love marriage with a
previous romantic partner because it would weaken their relationship with their parents.
Even those who chose a love marriage reported that they highly valued their parents’
appraisal of their marriage partner and went to great lengths to secure their parents’ blessing.
When parents were open to a love marriage, it greatly reduced the costs associated with that
option and made it more desirable to young people. Large changes to marriage practices,
therefore, only become possible when the older generation adopts a new outlook on
marriage.
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CHAPTER 3: ROKA ENGAGEMENTS AND THE HYBRIDIZATION OF
ARRANGED AND “LOVE” MARRIAGE IN URBAN INDIA
Abstract
In many parts of the world, arranged marriage is a common practice. Much of the
sociological literature in arranged marriage contexts tends to classify marriages as either
arranged or based on self-choice, ignoring the growth of hybrid marriages. Using data from
48 interviews and a representative survey, this study documents the central role of “roka”
marriage engagements in the hybridization of arranged and self-choice marriage (also known
as “love marriage”) in New Delhi. Couples in arranged marriages often engage in courtship
during their engagement period drawing on the scripts of romantic love. This contact,
however, may lead to a broken engagement if they couple determine that they are not
compatible. Half of survey respondents in the Delhi region support breaking off an
engagement in the case of incompatibility, reflecting the growing importance of emotional
compatibility and personal autonomy in marriage decision-making. A second way in which
roka is used in the hybridization of arranged and love marriage is for couples in premarital
romantic relationships seeking to marry. These couples often use roka to signal that they
have obtained parental endorsement of their “arranged love marriage.” The case of roka
engagements in New Delhi reveals important ways in which the definition of arranged
marriage now incorporates romantic love, individualism, and autonomy.
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Arranged marriage, a system where parents choose their child’s marriage partner, remains
common in many parts of the world (Allendorf and Pandian 2016; Yeung, Desai, and Jones
2018). Some of the highest rates of arranged marriage can be found in South Asia. Despite
numerous predictions that the practice would decline in favor of Western-style self-selection
of one’s marriage partner, arranged marriage remains a persistent feature of Indian family
systems, even as the country has experienced economic growth, urbanization, and
advancements in education. Rather than shifting to self-selection of one’s marriage partner,
Indians increasingly describe their marriage as something in-between arranged and selfselection. In fact, two thirds of Indian women married in the 2000s had marriages which
could be categorized as “joint arranged” (Allendorf and Pandian 2016). Social scientists are
only beginning to understand what joint-arrangement means to Indian families and the
heterogeneity of different partner selection practices which can be found in India today. The
various ways in which Indian families are modifying arranged marriage to incorporate
romantic love, individualism, and autonomy reveals how “modern” cultural repertoires are
blended with the “traditional” values associated with arranged marriage.
In this paper, I shed light on the nature of joint arrangement by focusing on a pivotal
period in the marriage arrangement process in India which has received limited attention in
the literature: the engagement. Drawing on 48 interviews among middle class individuals and
new survey data from New Delhi, I document how engagements are used by young people
to blur the distinction between self-choice, often referred to as “love marriage,” and
arranged marriage. In North India, families mark the end of the arranged marriage search
process with an event often called roka, beginning a period of betrothal for the couple until
the wedding day. I find that this roka engagement period is frequently used by couples in
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arranged marriages to engage in courtship and develop a romantic relationship. New
technologies like mobile phones and social media facilitate this contact during the betrothal.
Alternatively, couples in premarital romantic relationships intending to marry were also
found to use roka, albeit to different aims. For them, the roka ceremony helped signal the
social legitimacy of their relationship because their parents’ sponsorship allows them to treat
their marriage as though it were full arranged. Finally, I show how the betrothal courtships
of arranged couples can lead to broken engagements, a phenomenon which reveals the
growing importance of compatibility and autonomous choice in marriage decision-making.
Roka marriage engagements are an overlooked site for the hybridization of different
marriage scripts in the Indian context. By focusing on roka, I show that arranged marriages
in India are being reconceived as the definition expands to incorporate new practices.
Family change and the hybridization of marriage practices
The hybridization of marriage practices in India is significant because it seems to defy
important theories of global family change which anticipate adoption of a Western marriage
model. Goode’s (1963) theory of family change predicted that development,
industrialization, and urbanization would lead to a global convergence of family forms to the
Western model, including self-selection of one’s marriage partner. Growing individualism,
the impracticality of large extended family co-residence in cities, and the breakdown of the
traditional age or gender hierarchy in “modern” societies are often cited as causes for this
expected global convergence (Goode 1963, 1982; Pesando 2019). While some evidence has
been found of a link between economic development and family change for a number of
family indicators, such as fertility, marriage practices appear to have a weaker association
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with development and continue to show significant diversity across regions (Ortega 2014;
Pesando et al. 2019; Raymo et al. 2015; Ruggles 2009).
Other perspectives on global family change focus on the spread of ideas, values, and
cultural scripts. Even within Western societies, the idea that love is the most important
pretext for marriage and that marriages should be decided only by the couple involved is
relatively new (Coontz 2004; Giddens 1992). Across the 20th century, the cultural meanings
associated with marriage in American society experienced several major transformations as
part of a larger deinstitutionalization of family life in favor of individualized intimacy
(Cherlin 2004). The growing importance of individual autonomy, self-realization, and
romantic love in intimate relationships continues to shape family transformations globally
(Giddens 1992; Lesthaeghe 2010).
In developing countries, the literature has often focused on the spread of ideas about
the relationship between family and modernity. Thornton (2005) argues that beliefs that
Western family structures are both a cause and consequence of development have spread
throughout the developing world through colonialism, schools, travel, mass media,
missionaries and international development aid. Significant evidence has been found linking
endorsement of these Developmental Idealism beliefs with adoption of so-called “modern”
family behaviors in a variety of social contexts including Iran, India, Nepal, Turkey, and
China (Abbasi-Shavazi and Askari-Nodoushan 2012; Allendorf 2013; Allendorf and
Thornton 2015; Kavas and Thornton 2013; Lai and Thornton 2015; Thornton, Binstock, et
al. 2012). One of these beliefs is that self-selection of one’s marriage partner is both modern
and inherently good.
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However, family change may not manifest as a direct imitation of Western family
forms. Individuals, in both the developed and developing world, have access to a wide
variety of cultural repertoires or “scripts” regarding marriage at their disposable to make
sense of their lives and their choices (Swidler 2001). In blending different cultural scripts,
families may create new family structures and practices. Harkness and Khaled (2014),
describing the hybrid practice of consanguineous love marriages in Qatar coined the term
“modern traditionalism” because it is an amalgam of conventional practices with modern
elements of romantic love and choice. Similar hybrid marriage models have been
documented in Sri Lanka and Turkey as families have expanded the definition of arranged
marriage to incorporate elements of romance and autonomy (Hart 2007; Manglos-Weber
and Weinreb 2017; de Munck 1996). Even in the East Asian context, which has documented
a dramatic decline in arranged marriage, parents still play a central role in both the search
process and marriage decision-making (Tian and Davis 2019; Tsutsui 2013). Finding one’s
marriage partner through family introduction continues to be a common practice in China
today (Tian and Davis 2019). These examples from diverse social settings reveal how the
process of family change produces heterogeneous outcomes that reflect the cultural context
in which those changes are situated. The resultant family forms, while sharing elements with
Western family structures, are often entirely unique hybrids reflecting the multitude of
different cultural influences. This study builds on this literature by revealing how India’s
joint-arranged marriages allow young people to merge their desire for emotional intimacy
and romantic love with the values of respecting elders and following tradition.
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India’s joint arranged marriages
The literature has often highlighted India’s outlier status in the persistence of marriage
practices over time. Marriage remains nearly universal in India, divorce is rare, and nearly all
marriages are endogamous by caste and religion (Dommaraju 2016; Goli et al. 2013; IIPS &
ICF 2017; Yeung et al. 2018). In addition, India continues to have one of the highest rates of
arranged marriage in the world (Yeung et al. 2018). Both parents and young people alike
report a strong preference for arranged marriage over love marriage (Netting 2010; Reed
2021; Twamley 2013a). Dating is seen as taboo in many social contexts in South Asia and so
romantic relationships are often kept secret from the couple’s family members (Aengst 2014;
Huang 2018; Mody 2008). Those who do decide to have a love marriage sometimes face
social stigma especially if the marriage crosses caste or religious boundaries (Chowdhry 2010;
Mody 2008). As a result, love marriage remains uncommon in India. Only 6% of Indian
women married in the 2000s described their marriage as a love marriage (Allendorf and
Pandian 2016).
However, the story of the persistence of arranged marriage in India may not be as
clear-cut as this statistic would seem to indicate. It may be inaccurate to dichotomize
arranged and love marriage because recent evidence suggests that the distinction between
them has become fuzzy. Increasingly marriages today may fall on a spectrum somewhere
between arranged and love marriage, drawing on elements of parental authority as well as
personal choice (Fuller and Narasimhan 2008; Hart 2007). Allendorf and Pandian (2016)
document the rise of the “joint-arranged” marriage, a broadly defined term referring to when
young adults play some role in selecting their marriage partner. Using data from the India
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Human Development Survey, they find that joint arrangement was highest in India’s metros
(nearly 80% of marriages).
The existing literature is only beginning to piece together an understanding of what
joint-arrangement looks like in practice. Interview studies suggest that most young urban
Indians want an arranged marriage but also want to not feel compulsion, preferring instead a
system of parent-arranged “introductions” where they are allowed to choose whether or not
they want to proceed with marriage negotiations with the person after meeting them a few
times (Netting 2010; Twamley 2013b). These modifications allow these new hybrid forms of
arranged marriage to conform to norms of endogamy and respect for parental authority
while also incorporating elements of choice for young people. In particular, parents in
middle class families show a desire to prioritize emotional compatibility in addition to other
requirements such as caste, education, and occupation (Fuller and Narasimhan 2008). Online
matrimonial tools help families search for potential marriage partners together, allowing
families to meet the goals of both parents and the young couple (Titzmann 2013). Recent
survey data seems to suggest that most joint arranged marriages involve parents selecting
their child’s spouse but allowing them to “veto” options, often after meeting or speaking
with the potential match a few times (Reed 2021).
This can be contrasted with another form of joint arranged marriage, what is
commonly known as the “love-cum-arranged” marriage or “arranged love marriage”
marriage. This form of marriage occurs when a couple who have been in a secret romantic
relationship approach their parents for their approval to marry, a delicate process which may
take years of negotiations to successfully achieve (De Neve 2016; Uberoi 2006). By doing so,
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the couple brings their relationship under parental authority and control, allowing them to
avoid some of the shame associated with love marriage (Mody 2008). The parents often
choose to endorse the union and move forward as though the marriage were traditionally
arranged and may even present it as an arranged marriage in public (Donner 2016; De Neve
2016). It is unclear how couples in these types of marriages will classify themselves on survey
data as some research finds that they often refer to their marriage only as “arranged”
(Donner 2016). They may or may not use terms like “semi-arranged”. The public usually
makes a distinction between these types of unions and elopement love marriages done
against parent's permission, with only the latter being seen as a breach of social norms
(Mody 2008). However, Grover (2018) finds that arranged love marriages are also treated
differently than more traditional arranged marriages. Women in these unions access less
family support and assistance after marriage and may face heightened social scrutiny (Grover
2018; De Neve 2016).
Roka
This paper will focus on the social significance of the betrothal or engagement period for
urban North Indian couples. While marriage practices vary dramatically across the diverse
communities found in North India, it is common for families to signal the end of the
arranged marriage spousal search with some form of ceremony or ritual. In much of North
India this event is called a roka, a word which derives from the verb “to stop” in Hindi and
Punjabi (Chadha 2005; Myrvold 2004). This event signals that the two families have officially
agreed to the marriage match between their children and that they will stop their search for a
groom or bride. Though the term “roka” is most often associated with Punjabi Hindu
44

marriage traditions, related practices are found across India and within Hindu, Muslim, Sikh,
and Jain traditions. Other terms used for these types of betrothal rituals in North India
include sagai, mangni, tilak, and thaka. While each of these betrothal rituals have unique
elements and different practices, there is a commonality in how this event publicly signals
the end of the marriage search process and begins a betrothal period of wedding planning. In
this text, I will use the terms “roka” and “engagement” interchangeable to refer both to the
event or ceremony and the time period between this event and the wedding.
Roka ceremonies are usually muted events often attended by only a few family
members and taking place at home, in a temple, or in some public place like a restaurant
(Chadha 2005). During a roka ceremony, gifts such as clothes, dried fruit, and jewelry are
frequently exchanged between the bride and groom’s families (Chadha 2005; Myrvold 2004).
Sometimes a roka ceremony involves the exchange of rings, though this is often done in a
separate larger ceremony taking place after the roka called a shagan, mangni, or sagai. A
religious leader may be present to give a blessing to the match, lead a prayer, or set an
auspicious date for the wedding. India’s $50 billion wedding industry (Vaidya 2019), wedding
blogs, Bollywood and TV depictions, and news coverage of celebrity rokas have helped
popularize and homogenize roka engagement practices across India. In recent years, there
also appears to be a trend among the upper class of making the roka a more extravagant
affair (for an example, see the finale of Netflix’s Indian Matchmaking which features a roka
ceremony).
Historically, arranged marriage in India has meant that young people have little to no
contact with their betrothed both before the marriage is fixed and during the engagement
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period. Survey data found that 60% of women living in Indian metros who married in the
2000s report that they met their husband on the wedding day (Allendorf and Pandian 2016).
Only a small share of those women also said that they had another form of contact with
their husband such as speaking on the phone or communicating through email or chat
before the wedding. Rates of meeting one’s husband on the wedding day were highest in
North India relative to other regions of the country (Allendorf and Pandian 2016).
However, emerging evidence suggests that contact between the betrothed is
becoming increasingly common. A recent interview study in Nepal found examples of
contact between the couple during their engagement, though women were often unwilling to
admit the degree of contact for fear of stigma (Diamond-Smith et al. 2020). An ethnography
among middle-class Vattima Brahmins in Tamil Nadu also found an increasing social
acceptance of contact between the betrothed during their engagement period and an
openness to calling off the engagement (Fuller and Narasimhan 2008). In interview studies,
young unmarried Indians express a desire to begin developing a relationship with their
betrothed during their engagement, with the option of calling off the engagement if they
decide they are incompatible (Netting 2010; Twamley 2013b). Building on these studies, I
will show how couples use their engagement period to blend different traditions and the
cultural repertoires associated with love and arranged marriage.
Data and methods
This paper uses qualitative data from 48 semi-structured interviews and descriptive results
from a survey. All interview respondents were part of the urban middle-class residing in the
New Delhi metro region. The study focuses on the urban middle class because this
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population navigates a wide range of competing cultural influences from Bollywood to
Western media to conservative religious and caste institutions. Middle-class was defined as
having or currently pursuing a college degree.
Interviews were conducted face-to-face between July 2018 and March 2019 with
three groups: 1) recently married/engaged individuals; 2) unmarried young people; and 3)
parents of unmarried young people. The aim in interviewing these three different groups was
to gather a variety of perspectives on current marriage practices. Snowballing was used to
recruit participants. Interview respondents were located through several means: 1) through
cold-calling households with unmarried persons who had participated in the survey also used
in this analysis; 2) through recruitment posts in closed Facebook Delhi neighborhood
groups; 3) through recruitment texts shared on the WhatsApp messaging app; 4) by
approaching college students near a local campus. The WhatsApp messages shared across
the researcher’s social network and the cold calls to survey participants generated the
majority of the interview respondents. The interview respondents came from a wide range of
caste and religious communities found in the Delhi middle-class including Hindus from both
upper castes and lower status castes (including the oppressed caste group of Dalits as well as
“Other Backward Classes” (OBCs)), Sikhs, Jains, and Muslims. While there are differences in
marriage practices across these communities, they all have high rates of arranged marriage
and most practice some form of roka-like engagement, though the practice often goes by
different names.
Table 1 contains a description of the interviews conducted for this research. The
largest group of interview respondents were the recently married or engaged, from which I
draw case studies of different experiences with roka. Thirty recently married or engaged
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people were interviewed including 16 women and 14 men from 16 different-sex couples.
Two of the husbands refused participation in the study. The respondents were interviewed
alone and separate from their spouse allowing them to speak freely about their marriage. The
married and engaged respondents ranged in age from 23 to 35. Eleven of the couples
described their marriage as primarily or completely arranged and the remaining five
described their marriage as a love or arranged love marriage. All the couples had been
married within the past four years, except one couple which was currently engaged at the
time of the interview. Twelve of the 16 couples were dual earner. The married or engaged
respondents, being part of the urban middle class, were primarily employed in professional
occupations such as management, medicine, and information technology (IT).
Table 1: Description of interviews conducted in the New Delhi region, July 2018 –
March 2019
Number of
Interviews Participants
Recently married/engaged individuals from 16 different-sex couples
Individual interviews with married/engaged women
16
16
Individual interviews with married/engaged men
14
14
Total recently married/engaged individuals
30
30
Unmarried people aged 18-29
Individual interviews with unmarried women
2
2
Individual interviews with unmarried men
4
4
Group interviews with unmarried women
3
8
Group interviews with unmarried men
1
3
Total unmarried people
10
17
Parents of unmarried people aged 18-29
Individual interviews with mothers
3
3
Individual interviews with fathers
1
1
Group interviews with mother and father
4
8
Total parents
8
12
Grand total
48
59
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The remaining 18 interviews were conducted with middle-class unmarried young
adults and the parents of unmarried young adults living in the New Delhi region. As
depicted in Table 1, ten interviews were conducted with unmarried young people aged 18-29
including six individual interviews and four interviews with small groups. The group
interviews provide unique insights into how young adults speak to each other about marriage
practices like roka. The groups interviewed included a group of brothers, a group of sisters,
and two groups of female friends. Half of the young adults interviewed were women. Slightly
over half were college students.
In addition, eight interviews were conducted with parents, including three interviews
with mothers, one with a father, and four group interviews with both the mother and father
together. Due to lower education levels in older cohorts, not all of the parents were collegeeducated but all of them had children who were college educated. Most of the mothers
interviewed identified as a housewife though one of the mothers was a doctor. The fathers
interviewed worked in retail, government service, and construction. The parents were asked
about their plans and expectations for their unmarried children’s marriages.
A semi-structured interview guide was used which included several questions on roka
practices, in addition to other questions on marriage attitudes and experiences. Interviews
took place either in the home of the respondent or a public place such as a coffee shop. The
interviews were conducted in Hindi and/or English, depending on preference of the
respondent. A local female research assistant attended and participated in all interviews with
the author. All but one of the interviews were audio recorded. All interviews were
transcribed, and, if relevant, translated by the research assistant. The interview data was
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analyzed with the ATLAS.ti software using iterative waves of coding based on topics and
themes. After carefully reading both the husband and wife interviews several times and
searching for patterns and disconfirming evidence, each couple was classified by their
experience with roka. The interviews with unmarried young people and parents were
primarily used to provide context regarding social attitudes on roka engagements. In the text,
pseudonyms are used for the study participants and some identifying details have been
changed.
This interview data is supplemented with descriptive results from a representative
household survey conducted in the Delhi National Capital Region (NCR) in 2016 and 2017
by the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI). The
NCR is an urban agglomeration which includes the National Capital Territory of the capital
city of Delhi (similar to the District of Columbia in the United States) as well as 18 adjacent
districts from the states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The 2016 CASI Delhi
NCR Survey sampled from the urban-classified areas in this region using the 2013 definition
of regional boundaries, representing a total population of 30 million people according to the
last census. The 2014 electoral rolls are used as the sampling frame from which the majority
of the clustered random sample is drawn. The sample was also supplemented using a
“random walk” method which aimed to capture potentially missing households on the
electoral rolls (Sircar and Chakravorty 2021). Comparison of the sample to other existing
datasets including the 2011 Census and the National Sample Survey suggest that the data
yield a representative sample in terms of caste, religion, gender, and migrant status (Sircar
and Chakravorty 2021).
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The CASI Delhi NCR Survey is the first to ask about attitudes towards roka
engagement practices, providing a unique opportunity to examine this topic systematically.
In total 5,477 individuals were surveyed and there is complete data on attitudes towards roka
from 5,379 of those respondents. Combining the interview and survey data provides a
comprehensive look at attitudes towards roka in the New Delhi region. While the interview
data is drawn from the urban middle-class, the survey results are representative of the urban
population of the region across social and economic classes.
Today, couples are often in contact during their roka
Since there is no longitudinal data on roka engagement practices from surveys and only
limited description of the practice in ethnographic accounts, it is not possible to definitively
determine how the practice has changed over time in North India. However, most of those
interviewed expressed a belief that the practice had indeed changed over the past several
decades. It was common to hear the middle-class interview respondents say that, previously,
little or no contact was allowed between the betrothed during their engagement; however,
now this contact is considered socially acceptable by many families. Kumar, tailor and father
of three unmarried sons in their twenties, explained that “according to the earlier rules, after
the roka, the girl and the boy didn’t meet. They didn’t. But looking at conditions nowadays,
once the roka… is done, the girl [and boy] meet each other.” Jayanti, an unmarried woman
in her late 20s said:
Quite a few things have changed. Earlier they wouldn’t even show you the
person you were marrying. Earlier… the parents would like someone and
then you were supposed to get married to this person and you would only
see them the actual day of the wedding. This has changed. Now you are
shown the person. You are asked. Now people talk on the phone as well….
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You end up meeting the person… once or twice before the wedding. This
never happened earlier.
Jayanti’s quote highlights how mobile phones facilitate contact between the betrothed
that would not have previously been possible. While both Kumar and Jayanti’s quotes
suggest a level of social acceptability within the urban middle class of the betrothed talking
during the engagement period, several respondents said that permission for contact between
the betrothed is often not explicitly given by parents. Sumit, an unmarried graduate student
in his late twenties described how parents give “unspoken permission” for couples to speak
during their engagement:
[In our caste community], some people’s parents don’t have an issue with
the children meeting each other [before the wedding], but most parents
don’t allow them to meet. However, there will be an unspoken permission.
There will be someone in the house who will be supportive. This person
will take the contact number. Suppose my ring ceremony is going to
happen, and if I’m comfortable being frank with my sister-in-law… then I
can tell her to ask for the girl’s number. Once I have the number, I can talk
to her, and then I can meet her outside somewhere. But parents can’t be
told, on either side. So basically, it isn’t allowed.
While some parents may allow the couple to meet, many parents refuse to give legitimacy to
this contact through explicitly endorsing it. The role of interlocuters who help facilitate
clandestine contact between the betrothed during their roka came up in several interviews
besides Sumit’s. According to some respondents, it was common for female relatives such as
a sister-in-law or aunt to play this role.
The survey data reveals that roka engagements, where the couple are in contact
before their marriage, have become socially acceptable within many communities, not solely
the middle class. Respondents to the 2016 CASI Delhi NCR Survey were asked whether it
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was acceptable or right to have a roka engagement, also known as a sagai, where the couple
communicate with each other during their betrothal. In total, 65.4% of respondents felt that
a roka, where the couple are in contact before the wedding was an acceptable practice,
whereas 23.1% did not think it was acceptable and 11.5% said they were not sure. Attitudes
towards the acceptability of roka were similar across wealth and education levels, though
those who expected young people in their family to participate in selecting their own spouse
were more likely to say that roka was an acceptable practices (Reed 2021). Those who said
that roka was an acceptable practice were also asked how long the engagement should ideally
last. The most common response, which was given by nearly 20% of respondents, was 4
weeks. The mean number of weeks of engagement which respondents found desirable was
6.5. While the range was quite large, most respondents were clustered around the median of
4 weeks. In fact, 50% of respondents gave a response between two and six weeks.
The roka period as courtship for couples in arranged marriages
The interviews with middle-class married individuals suggest that many couples treat their
roka period as a courtship where they get to know each other, test out their compatibility,
and even develop a romantic relationship before their wedding. This section describes the
experiences of two couples, Preeti and Arun and Nishita and Sagar, whose roka engagements
illustrate typical experiences of middle-class couples in arranged marriages.
Preeti and Arun were married two years before our interviews in a lavish wedding
attended by hundreds of guests. Preeti and Arun both worked in management. Preeti was 27
when they married, and Arun was 29. Around three years ago, a mutual contact between
their families had suggested the match and so the two families arranged a meeting in a local
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mall. In the thirty minutes that Preeti and Arun spoke to each other alone that day, Arun felt
a connection. He explained that “one thing just clicked after another… we were comfortable
talking to each other.” In the car ride home, he told his parents that he was ready to move
forward with marrying Preeti. Preeti needed more time to decide. She found Arun on
Facebook and they had several conversations on the phone and through Whatsapp messages
over the span of two weeks. They even arranged a meeting alone. Preeti explained that “I
want[ed] to discuss my priorities... so that we are on the same page.” After spending a day
together discussing their families, friends, lifestyles, and life goals, Preeti was ready to say yes
to Arun. Their roka took place two weeks later. Preeti and Arun’s roka ceremony was
attended by 40 friends and family members. As part of the festivities, several gifts were
exchanged. Preeti received diamond earrings from Arun’s family and Arun received a gold
chain from Preeti’s family.
During the three-month period between their roka ceremony and wedding, Preeti
and Arun continued their regular calls and messages, met each other’s friends, and planned
romantic daylong dates. Arun described their roka period in detail, explaining how his
emotions for Preeti deepened as they spent more time together. Arun described one special
day with Preeti during their roka:
We went around for the whole day. We had lunch and then we had
dinner… and that was where we got even more close because we went to
some old fort… We sat over there. We talked for a really long time. It was
the first time we kissed… so that became a connection spot itself. After
that, everything else escalated.
Arun’s description of this date with Preeti highlights the romance of his engagement period.
In addition to getting to know each other, they also explored physical intimacy. Arun did not
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have much experience dating so he sought advice from his friend’s wife on how he should
act during his dates with Preeti. He explained:
I never had a close girlfriend. Most of my friends were boys… This was
very new to me so I got help from my friend’s wife. They had gotten a love
marriage… At every point, I used to ask for her assistance… The first time
I went to meet [Preeti], I asked her what should I take. I had some idea that
I should take something. She said, ‘take something normal, like a perfume.’
So I took perfume and [Preeti] appreciated it…I didn’t have much
experience but I’m lucky that she didn’t mind.
Arun and Preeti treated their roka as a courtship and therefore he sought advice on how to
act with Preeti during his engagement from a confidant who had more experience with
courtship, a friend who had a love marriage. Arun’s description reveals that he experienced
the excitement and anxieties that might be expected for couples at the beginning of a
romantic relationship.
Preeti and Arun did not tell their parents about their meetings or conversations
during their roka. While they were not openly dating, they did have a few confidants within
their families who knew that they were in contact. Preeti confided in an aunt about her dates
with Arun whereas Arun sought advice from a sister-in-law, in addition to the advice he
received from the friend’s wife described above. It was also important to Arun for Preeti to
meet his friends. He explained:
The first time she met my friends was at a friend’s house… Before that
also, we had spoken on the phone through a common WhatsApp group….
I think it was a one-to-two-hour meeting, and then after that we went for
dinner. She said, ‘yeah, I like your friends. It’ll be a good circle.’… When I
dropped her off… it was like any two friends chatting… but I had that
feeling also that I like her, I’m going to marry her.
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Meeting each other’s friends and making sure that they would be able to merge their social
lives was important to many of the couples interviewed. Overall, Arun and Preeti’s roka
period was filled with the romantic moments, time spent getting to know one another, and a
process of integration into each other’s lives that was akin to romantic pre-marital courtship.
Even though their marriage was arranged, Arun and Preeti were able to incorporate many
elements of dating into their roka period. In doing so, they created a hybrid marriage form
that drew from both the cultural scripts of traditional arranged marriage and those of
romantic love.
Another couple, Nishita and Sagar, had a similar experience of courtship during their
roka period. Nishita and Sagar had been married almost two years before the interview and
had just recently had their first child together. Nishita was 24 when she married Sagar and
left her office job after marriage. Sagar, who worked as a business owner, was 25 when he
was married. Nishita and Sagar’s roka took place on the same day that their families first
met. Like Arun and Preeti, their match was suggested by a mutual family friend. Nishita
explained that their families met at a local mall in the late morning and she and Sagar were
given some time to speak privately to each other. Shortly after, they were asked if they
wanted to move forward with the marriage and both agreed. A celebratory lunch was
organized at a restaurant. That evening, the very same day that couple first met, the families
met again at Sagar’s family home for a small roka ceremony which involved the exchange of
a few small gifts between the families.
Nishita and Sagar’s roka set off an intensive period of getting to know each other in
the two and a half months before the wedding. Unlike Preeti and Arun, Nishita and Sagar’s
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family knew that the couple was in contact and supported the couple as they got to know
each other. Nishita even used the word “courtship” to describe her roka period. They met
three to four times a week during their engagement at the mall food court for coffee and
snacks. Nishita and Sagar even attended a wedding together with Sagar’s family while they
were engaged. Nishita explained how she used the roka period to get to know her husband
and his family through regular phone calls:
I used to talk to my in-laws on the phone every day, to mama (her motherin-law), and to him, [Sagar]…I was really curious to know… what is the
taste of the family, and what all will they like and dislike… what does their
family believe in … more than [Sagar] I think I spoke to my [mother-inlaw] … She’s actually very sweet. She used to tell me, ‘Your husband likes
this type of food, I like that type of food’… [She told me] what is the
[family’s] dressing sense, and what all they believe in and who all of the
relatives are.
Nishita was eager to learn about what kind of family she would be joining after marriage and
what their expectations would be for her as a daughter-in-law. Like Arun and Preeti, Nishita
and Sagar used their roka to get to know each other and each other’s’ families. As a result,
they entered their marriage with an already established relationship, a departure from the
more traditional practice of getting to know each other only after marriage.
Many couples had private conversations during their roka period in which they
shared information about their life or their past which was not divulged at the time of
arranging the marriage. Most commonly this included a history of romantic relationships and
whether they drink alcohol or consume non-vegetarian food. Since these things are often
considered taboo, parents were sometimes unaware of these aspects of their child’s life.
Thus, the couple exercise caution when divulging this information to their fiancé. Sagar had
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previously been in a serious romantic relationship with a woman that he had wanted to
marry. However, the relationship did not work out. Sagar explained how he shared this
information with Nishita:
I told her, not exactly on the same day, but I thought she should know…
anyone would feel bad, but I told her I think fifteen or twenty days before
our marriage. I said, ‘I’m hiding something from you, which I don’t think is
good. If you want to break [our roka], it’s okay.’
While Nishita was initially surprised by Sagar’s admission, she eventually accepted it and
decided against calling off their engagement, often called “breaking the roka.” She also had a
secret she had kept from Sagar, that she occasionally drinks alcohol, something taboo in
their community. Nishita explains how she told Sagar about her drinking:
During our roka we had a huge fight over [my drinking]. He told me that,
‘you never told me that you drink!’, and I said that I thought you’ll feel bad,
that’s why I didn’t tell you. There were actually a few fights in our roka
time… he doesn’t like it when something is hidden from him… my parents
always told me, that whatever is in your past, don’t tell your husband and I
followed that blindly which actually disturbed my life a bit… that hurt him
a lot.
Like many couples who spend a significant amount of time getting to know each
other during their engagement, Nishita and Sagar experienced their first fights during their
roka. Eventually, Nishita and Sagar learned to move past their conflicts. Nishita explained
that “slowly, things came into place and our understanding increased, and of course
eventually, the love increased also.” Sharing private details of their lives and experiencing
conflicts during the roka are part of treating the engagement as a courtship. Along with
going on dates, exploring physical intimacy, and meeting each other’s friends and family,
these practices blur the lines between arranged and love marriage.
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Finding incompatibility during the roka period
For some couples, the roka period does not go smoothly and they find themselves to be
incompatible. Arjun and Deepika had been married for nearly two years when I interviewed
them. When I met them, they already had a young daughter. Both Arjun and Deepika
worked for multinational companies. Their families lived in the same region far from where
Arjun and Deepika had built a home together in an apartment complex in the Delhi suburbs.
Arjun was 29 when he got married and Deepika was 27. While visiting home two years ago,
their parents arranged for them to meet alone at a local restaurant. Shortly after, Arjun and
Deepika agreed to move forward with the marriage and an engagement ceremony took place
a few weeks later. Arjun and Deepika’s engagement period was longer than those of some
couples. They were engaged for around six months before their wedding.
During their engagement, Arjun and Deepika spoke on the phone regularly and met
many times, though without the knowledge of their parents. Initially, Deepika was working
in another city. She planned a visit to Delhi to see Arjun. A few months into their
engagement Arjun visited Deepika for a weekend visit. Anticipating her move to Delhi with
her marriage, Deepika requested a transfer from her company and was relocated to the Delhi
office several months before their wedding. After her move to Delhi, she met Arjun more
regularly because they were living in the same city. Unfortunately, Arjun and Deepika
encountered issues with compatibility during their engagement period. Deepika explained:
After the engagement there were a lot of differences between us. We both
thought that we shouldn’t get married…that we shouldn’t go through with
this marriage, but for our society, our family, once the engagement has
happened, nothing can happen.
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Deepika explained that their “mindsets weren’t matching” and they had frequent
conflicts. Unfortunately, both agreed that breaking the engagement would be too
stigmatizing for themselves and their families so they should continue with the marriage
plans. Arjun draws a distinction between families which are more open towards calling off
an engagement and his own family:
[For our families], it’s not like it was the Delhi-type concept where we
would meet, talk to each other, find out the nature [of the person] in three
months, and then in the fourth month we would say no… ‘No’ is a very big
thing. I could have said ‘no.’ My parents also wouldn’t say anything, but it’s
very difficult to do after the engagement… Whatever is in your destiny is
what will happen, frankly speaking.
His community was more traditional, he explained, and a broken engagement would be
scandalous and shameful for their families. The incompatibility that had emerged during the
engagement continued into their marriage and both Arjun and Deepika described their
marriage as not particularly happy. Deepika explained that “even now it comes to our minds
that we should separate, but that’s not an option…that is not possible practically.”
Breaking a roka
Arjun and Deepika felt forced to move forward with their engagement due to a strong taboo
within their community on breaking a roka. A number of respondents spoke about the
stigma associated with a broken roka, both for the betrothed and also for their families.
Surjan, a 29-year-old unmarried office worker, explained that the stigma of a broken roka is
often primarily born by the woman who was engaged. He said, “rokas break a lot.. if any boy
or girl’s roka breaks off, then finding another match for her, through a relative or a third
person is difficult… even if one is found, people will call her names and say things about
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her.” Several respondents made comments similar to Surjan’s that women whose roka had
been broken have difficulty finding another partner and may face negative reputational
consequences. These reputational consequences did not seem to also apply similarly to men
in broken rokas. Another concern that may hold families back from breaking off an
engagement is the money already spent on the roka and for the wedding, including deposits
on a wedding venue, invitations, and other expenses that may not be refundable.
However, despite these costs and the potential stigma, some interview respondents
agreed that it was still better to call off an engagement if it appears that the couple will be
incompatible. Ruchita was a housewife who had already arranged her daughter’s marriage
and was currently in the process of searching for a bride for her son. She explained:
If [my daughter] had told me that she didn’t like the boy and she didn’t
want to marry him, then we would be more concerned with the child’s
happiness, obviously. We’ve already told our children, I told her even on
the day of the engagement, that she shouldn’t worry about how much
money we have spent, we’re more interested in her happiness, so that later
she shouldn’t accuse us of forcing her to do something, we would only
agree if you’re absolutely sure.
Being open to their child deciding to break the engagement is part of the move towards a
“joint-arranged” marriage where young people have a say in the decision. Ruchita did not
want her daughter to feel “forced” into marriage. She also emphasizes the importance of her
daughter’s happiness over the financial costs associated with breaking a roka.
The 2016 CASI Delhi NCR Survey also asked about whether a family should call off
a wedding and break a roka if it becomes clear that the couple are incompatible and would
have an unhappy marriage. The results are presented in Table 2. Only 48.5% of respondents
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shared the view of Ruchita, that it is better to break the roka if the couple are incompatible.
A fairly large proportion of respondents (25.1%) said they were not sure or didn’t know
what they thought about breaking a roka and 26.4% said that it was not right to break a roka
due to incompatibility. Table 2 also presents the cross-tabulation of attitudes towards
breaking a roka with attitudes towards whether roka, where the couple are in contact, is
acceptable. The cross-tabulation reveals that those who think it’s not right to break a roka
were much less likely to support contact during the roka period. In fact, 61.9% of people
who thought a couple should not be in contact before their marriage also said that it was not
ok to call off an engagement in order to avoid an unhappy marriage. On the other hand, only
17.5% of those who found it acceptable for a betrothed couple to be in contact said that it
was not ok to call off the engagement. This group was much more likely to say that it was
better to break the roka than risk an unhappy marriage.
Table 2: Crosstabulation of attitudes towards breaking a roka and whether a roka
where the couple are in contact is an acceptable practice
It is ok to break a roka to avoid
an unhappy marriage
Yes
No
Don't know
Roka, where the couple are
Yes
63.2%
18.5%
19.3%
in contact, is an acceptable
No
28.1%
61.9%
10.0%
practice
Don't know
5.9%
5.4%
88.7%
Full sample
48.5%
26.4%
25.1%
2
Notes: N = 5,379. Pearson’s Χ (4) = 2400, p < 0.001
Source: CASI Delhi NCR Survey 2016

Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

These results fit with the findings from the interviews with middle-class families
which suggest that families which find breaking a roka unacceptable will also attempt to
restrict couples from speaking during their engagement, for fear of the engagement being
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called off. Those who more freely allow the couple to speak during their engagement may
also be open to finding that the couple are incompatible which may necessitate calling off
the wedding. This second group is more likely to see the roka period as a trial of the
marriage whereas the former see the marriage as already finalized at the point of the roka, as
Arjun and Deepika’s families did.
Figure 1: Ideal time between roka and wedding by attitudes towards breaking a roka

Notes: This question was only asked of respondents who indicated that it was socially
acceptable for couples to have a roka where they are in contact during their engagement. N
= 3,545.
Source: CASI Delhi NCR Survey 2016
Additionally, there was a strong relationship between attitudes towards breaking a
roka and the ideal gap between the roka and the wedding among survey respondents. Figure
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1 depicts two histograms of the ideal gap between the roka and the wedding by the attitude
of the respondent towards broken rokas. Those who are more open to a broken roka
thought a longer roka period was preferrable. There was also greater variance in responses
within this group. Those who did not think it was acceptable to break a roka thought the
roka period should be very short, perhaps to prevent the possibility of the betrothed
changing their mind. The mean roka gap for those who thought it was acceptable to break a
roka was 7 weeks and the median was 4 weeks. For those who thought a roka should not be
broken, the mean ideal gap between the roka and wedding was 4 weeks and the median was
3 weeks.
Many of the parents interviewed explained that they believed that engagement
periods used to be longer in the past. According to them, families were now choosing to
have shorter engagements because they feared that, with the couple speaking during the
roka, the risk of breaking a roka had increased. Ruchita explains:
It used to be that way earlier, engagements would go on for a year or more,
but now no one sticks around… It breaks if someone says something to the
other or some relative says something… See, nowadays the boy and the girl
talk to each other on the phone all the time, nothing wrong with that… the
moment the engagement happens, the phone calls start. Someone says
something, they fight, and they end up breaking the engagement.
Ruchita’s quote emphasizes the role of the mobile phone in facilitating contact, and
potentially conflict, between the betrothed during their engagement. Another mother,
Vaishnavi, was a doctor with an unmarried son and daughter both studying in college.
Vaishnavi expressed a similar sentiment to Ruchita:
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I’ve seen a lot of negative effects of waiting so long, in many places. If it’s a
love marriage, it’s fine to wait for a year or more, but in an arranged
marriage set up, it’s best not to. Because in a year, there are many things
you find out about each other, good and bad, and then there’s no interest
left. The beauty of an arranged marriage is that there are so many things
you learn only much later about each other, and whether they’re good or
bad, we can adapt to them, we can accept them. [With a long engagement],
that gets over… The excitement is over.
Vaishnavi’s revealing quote highlights the potential of long roka engagements to dramatically
alter arranged marriage, where historically the couple know each other little before the
wedding. Allowing the couple to meet during the engagement and being open to breaking a
roka both reflect large expansions of the definition of arranged marriage to incorporate
personal autonomy and choice into the process.
Roka as legitimacy for love marriages
Roka also has significance for couples in what are often called “arranged love marriages”,
where a couple in a romantic pre-marital relationship gets full endorsement of their marriage
intentions from both sets of parents. This endorsement of parents for their children’s selfchosen match allows them to treat the marriage as though it were arranged. For these
couples, the roka ceremony is often an important symbolic gesture which signifies that the
families of the bride and groom fully support the match and will move forward with the
steps and customs associated with a traditional arranged marriage. In this way, couples
combine the courtship of a love marriage with the family involvement and rituals of an
arranged marriage.
Krishna and Shreya, who were married only a few months before our interview, were
one couple who had what could be called an “arranged love marriage.” They were both 26
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when they married after nearly five years of dating. They had met in the office where they
both worked in management for the same company. Krishna and Shreya had kept their
relationship mostly secret from their family members until they were ready to approach their
parents about marriage. Shreya explained the process:
He told his parents, and during our friend’s wedding reception, I met his
parents. But before meeting his parents, I made sure that I met my parents
and informed them… I made sure that I told my mom and dad about the
guy, about everything, and only once they approved [me meeting Krishna’s
parents], I decided that I’ll meet his parents….[Shortly after the friend’s
wedding], my parents came to Delhi, and they met Krishna for the first
time, and then both families met, and we decided that we want to do a
roka.
Shreya had taken great care in approaching her parents for their approval of the marriage
because she valued and respected their perspective. She explained:
I knew my father would have certain questions, so I already made sure that
I had the answers to those questions and when I spoke to him, I was of
course very nervous, but I thought that I will convince him…even if he has
some doubts, he [can] learn more about the guy and the family, but he
instantly said yes, so it, there was no challenge.
Shreya and Krishna were lucky to receive the wholehearted support of both of their
parents for their marriage, even though it was an inter-caste relationship. Beginning from
the roka ceremony, Shreya and Krishna’s parents began planning the wedding jointly as
though it were an arranged marriage, coordinating and planning the traditional rituals and
festivities together. By following the traditions associated with arranged marriage, such as
having a roka ceremony, Shreya and Krishna were able to transform their secret romantic
relationship into a respectable joint-arranged marriage endorsed by both sets of parents.
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Discussion
Transitional life stages, such as an engagement, are frequently a time for flexibility where
individuals negotiate between competing cultural repertoires to make sense of their lives. For
young couples in New Delhi, the roka engagement provides a cover to explore alternative
marriage scripts such as those associated with romantic love. As a result, the roka
engagement functions as a site for the hybridization of arranged and love marriage. This
study makes an important contribution to the emerging literature on the rise of jointarranged marriages in India by revealing how joint-arrangement actually works in practice
using new interview and survey data.
In this study I show that, for those in arranged marriages, the roka engagement
period is often one of courtship. This period of courtship allows couples to enact cultural
scripts of romantic love and emotional intimacy by going on dates, sharing secrets, meeting
each other’s friends, having their first conflicts, and exploring physical intimacy. In many
cases, roka engagements involve an intense amount of contact and relationship-building over
a condensed period averaging only around two months. Some families appear to support
their child speaking to their betrothed during the engagement and are open to calling off the
wedding if the couple find themselves to be incompatible. This openness to young people’s
opinion of their marriage partner and respect for their right of refusal up until the wedding
day reveals one way in which joint arranged marriage might manifest.
For individuals who have selected their own marriage partner, the roka can serve an
entirely different function. In this situation, the roka is a source of legitimacy for their
relationship within the structures of arranged marriage. Couples in these types of marriages
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use a roka ceremony to signal their parents’ full endorsement of their union thereby drawing
from the cultural scripts of arranged marriage including respect for parental authority and
Indian cultural tradition. There remains persistent taboo surrounding love marriage in India,
even within the urban middle class (Mody 2002). Couples in “arranged love marriages”, who
have followed marriage traditions like roka and have the support of both families, may avoid
some of the stigma associated with love marriage. These couples may even refer to their
marriage as arranged, as a few respondents did. With time, the fact that the marriage was
preceded by a romantic relationship may cease to hold much relevance.
The various ways in which families are modifying arranged marriage practices to
incorporate romantic love, individualism, and autonomy is an important emerging area of
research. The current study has examined this topic within the middle-class in New Delhi.
Further research is needed to understand how engagements and other marriage practices in
different arranged marriage contexts contribute to the hybridization of marriage forms. In
addition, this study has only captured the experiences of young people at a specific point in
time. It remains unclear if the current hybrid forms of joint-arranged marriage documented
in this text are a transitional phase in the decline of arranged marriage or if they reflect a new
more permanent family form. Future research which applies a longitudinal perspective is
needed to understand the answer to this question.
Technology plays a central role in facilitating new forms of contact between
betrothed couples. Interview respondents acknowledged that it has become nearly
impossible for parents to prevent betrothed couples from contacting each other during their
engagement. That is because young people in urban India have access to mobile phones,
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internet, and social media which allow them to easily find and initiate contact with people,
often without the knowledge of their parents. An estimated two-thirds of the urban Indian
population are active internet users and the share is likely higher among those in their 20s
(Kantar and IAMAI 2021). Though the intensive contact that is becoming common between
betrothed couples in New Delhi transgresses traditional norms barring contact before the
wedding, parents seem relatively powerless to stop it. While some parents appear to have
responded by trying to shorten engagement periods, others have responded by shifting their
own paradigm on what arranged marriage can and should look like.
Finally, the findings of this study suggest that researchers should use caution when
interpreting survey data on marriage arrangement type. In the Indian context, this question
suffers from social desirability bias due to a strong and persistent taboo on love marriage.
Furthermore, this study provides further evidence that a dichotomy between love and
arranged marriage may not be appropriate in capturing the nuance and complexity of
different marriage arrangements styles found in India today. Even the third category of
“joint-arranged” fails to capture the diverse ways in which couples are hybridizing arranged
and love marriage. Other options such as asking the degree of involvement of parents in
different parts of marriage decision-making (see Tsutsui 2013) may do a better job at
measuring the experiences of couples in India today.
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CHAPTER 4: THE GENDERED PRACTICES OF THE UPWARDLY MOBILE
IN INDIA
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between economic mobility and the practice of female
seclusion in Indian households using the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), a
nationally representative panel survey. Women from households which became wealthier
between survey waves had increased restrictions placed on their physical mobility as well as
higher odds of practicing head-covering or purdah. These results held even after the
inclusion of controls for changes in household composition, health of the woman, and her
labor force participation. Stratified fixed effects regression analyses revealed that mobilityinduced female seclusion was primarily practiced in poorer communities, in rural areas, and
among the less-educated. The findings suggest that economically mobile households may use
female seclusion as a strategy to signal household status.
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Female seclusion encompasses a variety of different practices of gender differentiation and
segregation common in South Asia which could include veiling or head covering (sometimes
known as purdah), restrictions on the physical mobility of women, the gendering of spaces
(both inside and outside of the home), and withdrawal of women from the public sphere and
the labor force (Derne 1995; Jacobsen 1982; Miller 1982; Papanek 1982). These gendered
practices remains widespread and nearly 60% of Indian households report practicing some
form of veiling or purdah (Desai and Andrist 2010; Desai and Temsah 2014; Stroope 2015).
The discursive meaning of each seclusion practice varies significantly across different
communities. For example, purdah may be used to enforce gender and age-based
differentiation in the household (Papanek 1982), control women’s sexuality and limit their
social power (Devi and Kaur 2019; Jacobsen 1982; Jeffery 1979; Liddle and Joshi 1989;
Vatuk 1982), build kin solidarity (Papanek 1982; Vatuk 1982), signal modesty/virtue (Devi
and Kaur 2019; Masood 2019a), or identify oneself as part of a social or cultural group
(Desai and Temsah 2014). To others it is a religious practice or even a tool of women’s
empowerment (Feldman and McCarthy 1983; Sultana, Jawan, and Hashim 2009;
Thangarajah 2003).
In South Asia, female seclusion is also linked to socioeconomic and caste status.
Women’s bodies are often employed as symbols of family’s honor with female seclusion
used as a strategy to protect that honor (Derne 1994; Dube 2001; Jeffery 1979; Vatuk 1982).
Culturally, female seclusion is sometimes associated with higher status communities who can
afford both to forgo women’s labor and to regulate women’s movement outside the home
(Amin 1997; Still 2011; Vatuk 1982). A classic literature documents how communities and
individual households may adopt female seclusion practices, often along with other religious
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and cultural practices, as they experience upward economic mobility (Srinivas 1952, 1989).
Therefore, female seclusion may be used as a strategy to perform the household’s newly
achieved status. On the other hand, some groups, like the highly-educated and cosmopolitan
city-dwellers, may use alternative scripts to perform their status which reject female seclusion
as a status marker (Gould 1961; Srinivas 1956, 1989). Much of the literature on social
mobility and female seclusion is based on historical evidence and older ethnographic
accounts. It is thus unclear whether upwardly mobile households today still view female
seclusion as a tool for signaling household status given the diversity of scripts for performing
status now available. This study will investigate whether economic mobility is associated with
the adoption of female seclusion in India. Using new nationally representative panel survey
data from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), I am the first to track how the
practice of female seclusion changes over time within Indian households and whether those
changes are associated with changes in household wealth. I then examine which subpopulations practice mobility-induced female seclusion by conducting stratified analyses by
direction of mobility, caste/religion, initial class position, education, and rural/urban status.
The relationship between female seclusion and household status in India’s diverse
communities
Research from the intersectional tradition shows how gender is embedded in the power
relations of other social identities (Choo and Ferree 2010; Collins 2000; Glenn 2002). In
India, gender practices are an essential part of group identity construction and the
maintenance of social boundaries by religion, caste, and social class. Because of their role as
repositories of group status, “the onus of boundary maintenance falls on women” (Dube
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1997, 89). The regulation of female sexuality through seclusion is important both in
maintaining patrilineal succession and endogamy (Liddle and Joshi 1989; Vatuk 1982).
Gender scripts which emphasize segregation and female modesty draw from larger cultural
frameworks regarding ideal Indian womanhood that were influenced by the colonial
experience (Chatterjee 1989; Liddle and Joshi 1989). However, education and urban
residence may expose households through globalization to alternative scripts of family and
social status, including those which reject female seclusion.
The practice of female seclusion varies across religious communities in India. Some
dimensions of female seclusion, such as restricting women’s physical mobility and
participation in the labor market, are similar across different religious communities whereas
purdah has different meanings within different populations. Muslims, who make up around
14 percent of the Indian population, have the highest prevalence of purdah practice.
According to the IHDS, around 85 percent of Muslim women in India practice some form
of veiling. Whereas Hindus tend to practice purdah after marriage to show respect to male
members of the husband’s family; Muslims often practice purdah after puberty in the
presence of all non-relatives (Jacobsen 1982; Papanek 1982; Vatuk 1982). Many Muslim
women in South Asia identify purdah, especially through the use of garments such as a
burqa, niqab, or hijab, as part of their religious practice (Masood 2019a; Sultana et al. 2009).
Around 55 percent of Hindu women report practicing some form of head covering, such as
pallu or ghunghat, according to the IHDS. Despite significant differences in the discursive
meaning of seclusion for Hindus and Muslims, there is evidence from both communities
that the practice may signal household status. Jeffery (1979), whose ethnography focused on
Muslims in Delhi, writes that purdah serves a “function of [signaling] the family’s worth, in
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an economic sense, but also [is] indicative of their social worth or their honor” (p. 25).
Thangarajah (2003) finds a similar pattern in Sri Lanka where Muslims families adopt gender
segregation practices observed during their time working in the Middle East as a marker of
household status.
Caste is another important social identity in the Indian context which intersects with
gendered practices like female seclusion. There are two overlapping systems of caste in India:
varna and jati. The varna system traces its origin to Vedic Hindu texts and outlines strata
based roughly on traditional occupations (Vaid 2014). The group formerly known as
“untouchables” are seen as outside of this classification system due to the impurity deriving
from their traditional occupations. In addition, there are thousands of sub-castes or jatis
whose correspondence to the varna hierarchy is both loose and contested (Vaid 2014). Caste
is also a politically salient identity. India’s constitution outlaws the practice of untouchability
and Indian law mandates quota-based affirmative action for the former-untouchables
(known as Scheduled Castes or Dalits), tribal populations (Scheduled Tribes or Adivasis),
and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), a heterogenous group of communities which are also
socially and educationally disadvantaged. Within the Hindu community, female seclusion has
been associated with ideals of modesty, morality, and ritual purity (Dube 2001). As a result,
female seclusion has culturally been associated with higher caste communities that are seen
as more ritually pure, especially Brahmins, whose traditional occupation as priests places
them at the top of the status hierarchy. The data from the IHDS, however, suggests that
purdah is practiced at similar rates across the broad caste categories, with only slightly more
Brahmins practicing it than other caste groups.
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Caste becomes especially salient in the way that different communities have adopted
female seclusion as part of the process of social mobility. Srinivas (1952) coined the term
“Sanskritization” to refer to cultural processes of change observed in rural India where
groups, particularly those from marginalized caste communities, emulated the rites, beliefs,
and values of “Sanskritic” Hinduism as a strategy for upward social mobility. This imitation
often includes adopting practices such as vegetarianism, temperance, dowry, and female
seclusion which are culturally associated with the Brahmin community (Srinivas 1952, 1956).
A number of ethnographies have documented how Dalit families adopt greater restrictions
on the mobility of young women in their families as the household experiences upward
economic mobility (Heyer 2014; Still 2011). While much of the literature on Sanskritization
focuses on its practice in Dalit and Adivasi communities, they are not the only groups to be
influenced by Sanskritization as other communities may also seek to make moral claims to
status by adopting these practices (Shah 2010). At the same time, there are popular social
movements which actively reject Sanskritization, seeing the practice as rooted in the system
of caste oppression. Those who identify with these movements may reject female seclusion
as a marker of status. Dalit social leader and architect of the Indian constitution, B.R.
Ambedkar argued against female seclusion practices along with his promotion of conversion
to Buddhism and inter-caste marriage as strategies in the fight against caste oppression. The
Self-Respect Movement in Tamil Nadu also promoted gender egalitarianism over
segregation as a strategy for uplifting marginalized communities and as a way to challenge
the power of the Brahmin community (Hodges 2012).
Social class, education, and urban cosmopolitanism shape exposure to cultural scripts
of status through female seclusion as well as alternative ways of claiming status. Data from
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the IHDS shows that the poorest quintile (by asset wealth) are the most likely to practice
purdah while the wealthiest quintile are the least likely. Researchers have documented how
India’s growing middle class may look outside of India for cultural frameworks of value and
gender relations, a process sometimes called “Westernization” (Berreman 1993; Gould 1961;
Srinivas 1989). For example, upwardly mobile middle-class families may view wearing
international brands as a more powerful status marker than purdah (Wilson 2013). In
addition to Westernization, evidence suggests that elite and middle class families are
constructing new ways of doing gender, status, and family that reflect the complexity of
different cultural scripts available to modern Indian families and a hybridization of
“traditional” and “modern” practices (Bhandari 2017; Fernandes 2006; Radhakrishnan 2011;
Shah 2014; Uberoi 2006; Vijayakumar 2013; Wilson 2013).
Education is another important factor which may influence a household’s views on
female seclusion. A large literature links educational institutions to the spread of values such
as individualism, secularism, and gender egalitarianism which may challenge cultural scripts
of social status through the seclusion of women (Ahearn 2001; Axinn and Barber 2001;
Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell 1983; Thornton, Ghimire, and Mitchell 2012). The evidence
of education impacting seclusion practices in South Asia, however, is mixed. Women from
more educated households were found to have less physical mobility in rural Bangladesh
than those from households with limited education (Balk 1997). However, the latest IHDS
data, suggests that it is the least educated who are more likely to practice purdah.
Much of the ethnographic literature documenting households using female seclusion
to signal status is based on evidence from rural areas. Caste-based discrimination is more
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prevalent in rural areas along with the beliefs regarding purity and modesty that are
sometimes associated with female seclusion practices (Coffey et al. 2018; Kapur et al. 2010).
Those who reject these cultural scripts may migrate to cities. In fact, migration to cities has
long been a strategy employed by Dalits to escape caste-based violence and marginalization
in their village (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998). According to the IHDS data, purdah is
more prevalent in rural areas. However, female seclusion norms remain salient in cities. A
smaller share of women in urban areas are in the labor force compared to rural areas
(Chatterjee, Desai, and Vanneman 2018). For those urban women in the labor force,
research suggests they often must navigate around seclusion norms in order to participate in
economic activity in the city (Feldman and McCarthy 1983; Kantor 2002). Urban families,
however, may be exposed more to globalization as well as greater diversity which could
introduce them alternative status markers such as Westernization.
In a country as large and diverse as India, there can never be one single cultural
framework of gender and social status. To some communities, female seclusion may be a
positive signal of social status, while in other communities it may have the opposite
association. It depends on the cultural scripts influencing the household and their
community. This paper will examine the link between female seclusion and household status
using a fixed effects modeling approach and panel survey data. I test whether the
economically mobile are adopting female seclusion as they experience economic mobility by
asset wealth. Then I investigate how that association varies by the direction of mobility,
caste/religion, initial economic position, education, and rural/urban status.
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Methods
Data
This paper uses data from the two completed waves of the India Human Development
Survey (IHDS). The IHDS, jointly organized by researchers from the University of Maryland
and the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in New Delhi, is one of
the first large-scale nationally representative panel studies of households in India (Desai,
Vanneman, and National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) 2019). The first
wave of the survey (IHDS I) was conducted in 2004-5 and the second wave (IHDS II) was
conducted in 2011-12.
The ‘Eligible Women’ module of the IHDS was used for the analysis. This section of
the survey was completed with one woman per household who was aged 15-49 and had ever
been married. The survey team was able to re-interview 76% of the initial IHDS I Eligible
Women respondents. IHDS II re-interviewed households that split apart between the waves
if their resultant households were located within the same are but did not follow migrants if
they moved outside of the sampled village or urban block between IHDS I and II. The recontact rate of 76% meets desired re-contact thresholds (Kristman, Manno, and Côté 2004).
Only those women who were married and present in both waves of the survey are included
in the analysis. Case-wise deletion is used to adjust for missingness on any independent or
dependent variable in the analysis in either survey wave (37.5% of the sample). This leaves a
total sample of 14,641 women for the analysis (29,282 total observations). Analyses
conducted without full case-wise deletion retained a higher proportion of the sample but
revealed similar results.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
IHDS
IHDS
I
II
(percent unless
otherwise
indicated)
Dependent variables
Places respondent requires chaperone to go (0-3)
Places respondent requires permission to go (0-3)
Respondent practices veiling (purdah/ghunghat/pallu)
Independent variables
Mean absolute asset wealth (of 30 items)
Mean relative assets wealth (z-score)
Control variables
Respondent does paid work
Respondent does unpaid work
Husband of respondent is absent (outmigration)
Respondent is senior or only married woman in house
Elder (aged 60+) man present in house
Respondent has at least one living son
Respondent reports being in poor health

Percent
with
increase

Percent
with
decrease

0.7
2.1
52.6

0.5*
2.1*
54.3*

20.1
28.9
12.7

26.6
32.0
11.0

11.8
0

15.2*
0

80.4
47.3

12.3
52.7

24.5
39.4
3.1
67.8
15.0
81.2
5.5

30.5*
43.1*
4.7*
77.2*
18.1*
88.1*
8.2*

14.8
15.2
2.9
12.7
10.7
7.6
7.1

8.9
11.5
1.4
3.2
7.6
.7
4.4

Fixed characteristics (for stratified analyses)
Caste/religious community
Brahmin
4.6
Other forward caste
15.8
Other Backward Class (OBC)
35.1
Dalit
22.6
Adivasi
8.7
Muslim
10.8
Sikh, Jain, Christian, or other
2.5
Initial class position (by asset wealth quintile)
Poor
28.7
Lower middle class
23.0
Upper middle class
28.0
Rich
20.4
Highest completed education level of respondent
No education
46.8
Primary (up to 9th standard)
36.0
Secondary or higher
17.2
Type of residence
Rural
68.0
Urban
32.0
* Indicates a statistically significant change in means between IHDS I and II (α = .05).
Notes: Household asset wealth is measured through a count of 30 common household assets and
measures of housing infrastructure. Relative asset wealth is a wave-specific z-score of this measure.
The measure is normalized by survey wave. N = 14,641.
Source: India Human Development Survey I (2004/5) and II (2011/12)
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Measures
Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 3. The
survey includes three measures of the practice of female seclusion which have been used
previously in the literature (see Desai and Andrist 2010; Desai and Temsah 2014; Stroope
2015). These three measures serve as the main dependent variables of analysis. The first
dependent variable is a dichotomous measure indicating that the respondent practices some
form of veiling (pallu, purdah, or ghunghut). While the overall proportion of households
practicing purdah remains relatively similar across the two waves of the survey, 23.7% of
respondents reported a change in practice. Purdah is not a single institution and its practice
varies dramatically across different groups. It may involve a norm that women cover their
head in the presence of males from their husband’s family or that they cover their head
whenever in public settings. It may include the use of the burqa, niqab, or hijab and the use
of one’s scarf, dupatta, or sari to cover part or all of the face and neck (Desai and Andrist
2010).
Restrictions on physical mobility are another dimension of female seclusion covered
in the IHDS. Two different measures capture important aspects of the regulation of
women’s movement. The first measure is the count of the number of places the woman
reported she could not go alone from a list of three common locations including: 1) the local
health center, 2) the home of a relative or friend, and 3) the grocery store. The count of
these places created a measure of the number of places the woman requires a chaperone
with possible values of 0, 1, 2, or 3. This scale measure has a Chronbach’s alpha score of .80
indicating high internal consistency of the scale questions. The second measure of mobility
80

comes from a count of the number of places that the woman reports that she “has to ask
permission” of her husband or a senior family member to go from the same list of three
common locations, regardless of whether she can go alone to those places. While in IHDS I
respondents could only answer yes or no to the permission questions, in IHDS II they were
also able to give a third response that they “must inform” but do not require permission.
This response was classified as not needing permission. The permission-asking mobility scale
has values ranging from 0 to 3 and a Chronbach’s alpha score of .81. As Table 3 indicates,
there is significant variation in both the prevalence and rate of change over time for each of
the three measures of female seclusion indicating that these measures capture different
dimensions of this complex and variegated practice.
The main independent variable is relative asset wealth. Assets were selected as a
measure of economic position because research has suggested that assets may be superior to
consumption and income in capturing economic welfare and poverty especially in
developing country contexts (Sahn and Stifel 2003). In India, asset ownership is less likely
than income or consumption to change due to short-term shocks, thus making it a better
measure of a household’s true economic position. It is also less subject to misreporting. The
IHDS data team constructed an asset wealth index variable, common across the two survey
waves, which is the count from 30 dichotomous measures of household assets and indicators
of housing infrastructure. This wealth index has already been used and validated in many
studies using the IHDS (see Stroope 2015; E. Chatterjee and Desai 2019; Lei, Desai, and
Vanneman 2019; Lei, Desai, and Chen 2020). The scale has a Chronbach’s alpha score of
internal consistency of .91. Assets include household items such as an air conditioner,
washing machine, pressure cooker, and color TV. The measures of housing quality included
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piped indoor water, a separate kitchen, flush toilet, electricity, liquid petroleum gas, and a
finished/permanent (pucca) wall, roof, and floor. There is an increase in the mean assets
index score between the two survey waves from 11.8 to 15.2. For ease of interpretation, I
have normalized the distribution of the assets score for each survey wave by calculating a zscore of asset wealth. Each household has an IHDS I and IHDS II z-score reflecting their
relative position on the wealth distribution of all surveyed households in each survey wave.
Thus, economic mobility is defined as a change in wealth z-score. Presenting the results as zscores allows an interpretation of the coefficients based on standard deviation increases in
wealth over time. As a robustness check in Table 6, I also conduct the analysis using the
unstandardized raw asset wealth (count) measure and find the same general results.
Several control and stratifying variables are also used in the analysis. Three types of
time-variant control variables are included to control for changes in the respondent’s labor
force participation, the composition of her household, and her health. In addition, variables
capturing fixed characteristics of the respondent or her household are used in stratified
analyses of the results. This allows for a test of whether the economic mobility effects vary
by sub-populations.
First, the analysis will control for the respondent’s labor force participation to isolate
the effects which are due specifically to changes in the wealth of the household. Some
literature on female seclusion has examined the way that withdrawal of women from the
labor force is one means through which households practice female seclusion (Amin 1997;
Still 2011). Unfortunately, it is difficult to examine the relationship between household
economic mobility and this dimension of female seclusion because women’s paid labor is
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intrinsically linked with the household’s economic position. Removing a worker from the
paid labor force will reduce a household’s income and may also impact household wealth.
Because of this complicated relationship between women’s labor force participation and
household economic status, I have elected to focus on other dimensions of female seclusion
in this analysis, which do not suffer from this ambiguity, and treat labor force participation
as a control variable. In Table 7, however, I examine the relationship between household
wealth and female employment, finding results which broadly support the theory. Two
dichotomous variables capture whether the respondent is in the paid or unpaid labor force at
least part-time, which is equivalent to around five hours per week for the past year. Paid
work was defined as any work for wages or a salary. I also examine unpaid non-domestic
work which includes animal husbandry, family farming, or contributions to a family business
for which the worker is not compensated financially. These forms of work, though
uncompensated, may also take women outside of the home and in mixed gender settings.
Household composition is a competing explanation for changes in gender practices
and therefore controls are included in the models to capture these changes. Multigenerational households could practice more female seclusion either because they are more
traditional or because the seclusion practices are used to reinforce age hierarchies in the
home. Especially in Hindu households, women may be expected to practice purdah in the
presence of specific relatives such as their husband’s elder male kin (Devi and Kaur 2019;
Jacobsen 1982; Vatuk 1982). Though perhaps less common, there is also documented
evidence of South Asian Muslim women practicing veiling around their husband’s elder male
kin (Jeffery 1979; Vatuk 1982). In addition, older women present in the household, such as
the mother-in-law may enforce certain forms of female seclusion (Derne 1995; Jeffery 1979).
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Previous literature has also suggested that women may enjoy benefits after having a son
which could include a relaxation of restrictions on her mobility (Kishore and Spears 2014).
Four dichotomous variables are included to control for these dimensions of household or
family composition. A dichotomous variable was created to indicate that the respondent was
the senior (in age) or only married woman in the household. If the husband of the
respondent was listed as non-resident due to migration, then the respondent was classified as
having an “absent” husband. A dichotomous control variable captures whether there are any
elder men in the household aged 60 or older. Another control variable captures whether the
woman has any living sons.
Finally, a dichotomous control variable is included in the model to indicate whether
the respondent reports being in poor or very poor health. If the respondent becomes ill, it is
possible that some dimensions of female seclusion may be relaxed to accommodate her care.
Furthermore, serious illness may also limit physical mobility.
Table 3 also includes data on fixed characteristics of the respondent or her
household which are used as stratifying variables in the analysis. The respondent’s response
in IHDS I is used to construct variables indicating the household’s initial economic position,
caste or religious community, education level of the respondent, and rural/urban status.
Initial economic position is constructed by creating quartiles from the IHDS I asset wealth
measure. The caste or religious community variable uses broad government definitions of
subgroups. Another stratifying variable is constructed to indicate whether the respondent’s
household experiences upward or downward mobility between IHDS I and II, by
differencing the respondent’s z-score in IHDS II and IHDS I. If the household’s position (z84

score) increased, they were classified as upwardly mobile; whereas if their position decreased,
they were classified as downwardly mobile.
Analytical strategy
The IHDS provides one of the first opportunities to systematically examine changing
patterns of female seclusion over time within the same households. The availability of
multiple time periods permits the use of a fixed effects methodology which focuses on
within-individual variation across the two survey waves. This paper employs individual fixed
effects Poisson and logistic regressions to capture how changes in relative household wealth
are associated with changing gender practices.
Fixed effects models control for “fixed” characteristics of an individual and
therefore, only examine variation within the same respondent over time. By controlling for
time-invariant characteristics of the individual, fixed effects models remove much of the
omitted variable bias and are considered more robust (Allison 2009). In the analysis that
follows, the “wealth effect” can be interpreted as the effect that a change in household
relative wealth has on changes in women’s responses to measures of female seclusion.
Fixed effects logistic regressions are used for the dichotomous dependent variable
measuring the practice of purdah; whereas, fixed effects Poisson regressions are used for the
two count-based physical mobility dependent variables which have values ranging from 0 to
3. With fixed effects modeling, not all cases in the sample are used for the regression. In
fixed effects logistic regressions, the cases contributing to the coefficients come only from
those individuals who change on the outcome variable (Allison 2009). This means that, for
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the purdah regressions, only those respondents who change their purdah practice contribute
to the coefficients, even though the whole sample is used in the analysis. For the fixed
effects Poisson regression, individuals who report a value of 0 in both survey waves are
dropped from the analytical sample during the analysis (Allison 2009). Bootstrap standard
errors made through 1,000 replications are used for all models. Using bootstrap standard
errors helps adjust for the issue of overdispersion which can skew standard error estimates in
a fixed effects Poisson regression (Allison 2009).
I also examine how the wealth effects on female seclusion vary by subpopulation, by
completing stratified analyses. Separate fixed effects regressions are run on sub-samples
defined by the direction of economic mobility between the survey waves, caste/religion,
initial economic position, education, and rural/urban status. Stratified regression analyses are
preferred in this case to interactions because nonlinear models like the logit and Poisson
present unique challenges in interpreting interaction effects (Mize 2019). Presenting results
as predicted probabilities or marginal effects, the most common approach used to address
this issue, is not feasible for fixed effects models in short panel datasets like IHDS because
of a well-known incidental parameter problem (Greene 2004). Stratified regression analysis
avoids both the interaction interpretation issues as well as the incidental parameters problem.
The significance level and sign of the coefficients can be compared across the different
stratified regressions to uncover which populations are practicing mobility-induced female
seclusion. While the magnitudes of the coefficients cannot be directly compared, this does
not hinder my analysis, which hinges on determining the presence of positive or negative
wealth effect in different subgroups rather than ranking their relative magnitudes.
86

Hypotheses
In the analysis, I test five hypotheses regarding the relationship between economic mobility
and female seclusion and how these associations are stratified across groups. The first
hypothesis is that economic mobility, as measured by household asset wealth, will be
associated with female seclusion practices. To further understand the effects, I examine
whether the fixed effects results are driven by the upwardly mobile or downwardly mobile by
running stratified regressions on the two groups separately. I do not expect downwardly
mobile households to change their gender practices and instead anticipate the results will be
driven by the status-anxious upwardly mobile. Next, I use stratified regressions to identify
which, if any, sub-populations change their practice of female seclusion as they experience
economic mobility. The second hypothesis states that the positive wealth effects on female
seclusion will be restricted to only lower or middle status groups (Dalits, Adivasis, and
OBCs). These groups are the ones most often discussed in the literature on Sanskritization
and may see female seclusion as a strategy to assert status within this framework of moral
claims-making. For the third hypothesis, I will examine how wealth effects on female
seclusion vary by initial economic position. I anticipate that positive wealth effects will be
present for households in the poorest quintiles while negative or non-significant effects will
be present for households in the wealthiest quintile. Status anxiety and a desire to assert
status are expected to be more powerful drivers for those leaving poverty. Furthermore, the
literature suggests that wealthy segments of Indian society may follow alternative cultural
scripts such as status through “Westernization” (Berreman 1993; Srinivas 1956). Relatedly,
the fourth hypothesis is that the positive wealth effects will only be found for the least
educated respondents. Negative wealth effects are expected for the most educated women
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because their education may signal that their household values female education and may not
subscribe to cultural script of female seclusion as a status marker. In addition, those with
more education may reject female seclusion if their education was co-educational and
included explicit teaching on gender egalitarianism. Finally, the fifth hypothesis is that the
positive wealth effects on female seclusion will only be present in rural areas. Those in more
cosmopolitan urban areas may subscribe to alternative gender scripts which do not valorize
female seclusion.
Results
Evidence of wealth effects on female seclusion
The results presented in Table 4 provide a test of the first hypothesis, that economic
mobility is associated with the practice of female seclusion. Models 1-4 depict asset wealth
(z-score) coefficients from individual fixed effects Poisson regressions on the physical
mobility measures. Model 1 shows that a one standard deviation increase in asset wealth
between the survey waves is associated with an increase in the number of places that the
respondent reports that she requires a chaperone to visit by .126. This result is statistically
significant even after controlling for labor force participation, household composition, and
health as shown in Model 2. Similarly, Model 4 shows that, holding all other variables
constant, an increase in relative asset wealth is associated with a statistically significant
increase in the number of places that a respondent requires permission to go. Finally, Models
5 and 6 examine the association between asset wealth and the practice of purdah using a
fixed effects logistic regression. Exponentiating the coefficient in Model 6 reveals that the
odds of practicing purdah increase by 13% for households which experienced a one standard
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deviation increase in household wealth. This result is statistically significant, and the
magnitude is not impacted by the inclusion of control variables. These results clearly show a
positive relationship between household wealth and the practice of female seclusion across
all three measures.
Table 4: Coefficients from individual fixed effects Poisson and logistic regressions
Number of places (of 3) respondent requires
a chaperone to go
permission to go
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Asset wealth
(z-score)

0.126***
(0.031)

Paid work

0.036**
(0.011)

-0.102**
(0.038)
-0.109**
(0.034)
-0.530***
(0.092)
-0.172***
(0.047)
0.118**
(0.042)
-0.293***
(0.061)
0.201***
(0.051)

Unpaid work
Husband
absent
Respondent is
senior woman
Elder man in
household
Has son(s)
In poor health
Wave II

0.105***
(0.031)

-0.246***
(0.019)

-0.186***
(0.021)

0.032**
(0.011)

Respondent practices
purdah
(5)
(6)
0.126*
(0.060)

-0.008
(0.012)
-0.008
(0.012)
-0.384***
(0.038)
-0.060***
(0.016)
-0.021
(0.015)
-0.015
(0.021)
0.016
(0.019)
-0.034***
(0.006)

-0.020**
(0.007)

0.126*
(0.060)
-0.193**
(0.071)
0.149*
(0.067)
0.226
(0.184)
-0.131
(0.095)
0.078
(0.086)
0.265*
(0.134)
0.161
(0.094)

0.140***
(0.033)

0.129**
(0.037)

Observations
14,924
14,924
28,248
28,248
6,938
6,938
AIC
18,569
18,395
37,812
37,732
4,791
4,781
AIC in null
18,591
18,591
37,816
37,816
4,794
4,794
Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Notes: Coefficients are from fixed effects Poisson regressions for Models 1-4 and a fixed effects
logistic regression for Model 5 and 6. The fixed effects Poisson regression drops cases where all
outcomes are zero. The fixed effects logistic regression estimation procedure does not incorporate
information about women who did not change their response to the question. The number of
observations varies by outcome variable due to these restrictions. AIC is the Akaike Information
Criterion statistic. AIC in null is the AIC statistic for the model with individual and time fixed effects
but no covariates. Total N = 14,641 women (29,282 observations).
Source: As for Table 3.
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Table 5: Relative wealth coefficients from individual fixed effect Poisson and logistic
regressions stratified by sub-population
Subpopulation
(each cell is a
separate
regression)

Number of places (of 3) that the respondent requires
a chaperone to go
permission to go
Wealth
Coeff.

Direction of mobility
Upwardly
mobile
0.178*
Downwardly
mobile
0.009

Respondent practices
purdah

S.E.

Obs.

Wealth
Coeff.

S.E.

Obs.

Wealth
Coeff.

S.E.

Obs.

0.077

6,984

-0.009

0.025

13,362

0.118

0.132

3,212

0.069

7,940

0.006

0.025

14,886

-0.098

0.138

3,726

Caste and/or religion
Muslim

-0.082

0.087

1,838

0.043

0.031

3,046

0.178

0.199

772

Adivasi

0.091

0.102

1,488

0.011

0.036

2,494

-0.004

0.210

696

Dalit
Other
Backward
Class
Other
forward caste

0.169*

0.073

3,316

0.112***

0.022

6,384

-0.153

0.130

1,490

0.180***

0.050

5,538

-0.004

0.018

9,966

0.196

0.109

2,166

0.085

0.091

2,018

0.008

0.030

4,398

0.350*

0.141

1,310

-0.430*

0.211

498

-0.01

0.062

1,262

0.089

0.374

370

0.325***

0.053

5,074

0.067***

0.019

8,166

0.243*

0.113

1,890

0.033

0.063

3,690

0.074***

0.022

6,576

0.061

0.127

1,550

0.075

0.069

3,830

0.071**

0.022

7,886

0.153

0.127

1,980

0.043

0.111

2,330

0.004

0.032

5,620

-0.013

0.167

1,518

7,954

0.065***

0.015

13,382

0.254**

0.092

2,916

5,054

0.009

0.019

10,082

0.117

0.094

2,778

1,916

0.022

0.032

4,784

-0.194

0.151

1,244

Brahmin
Initial class position
Poorest
Lower
middle class
Upper
middle class
Rich

Respondent’s highest completed education
No
education
0.066
0.042
Primary
school
0.166**
0.054
Secondary
school +
0.152
0.104
Type of residence
Rural

0.154***

0.037

10,898

0.034*

0.013

19,362

0.305***

0.077

4,396

Urban

-0.032

0.068

4,026

0.046*

0.022

8,886

-0.215*

0.108

2,542

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Notes: Each cell shows the wealth coefficient from a separate regression on a sub-population for a
total of 54 regressions. Coefficients are from fixed effects Poisson regressions for the mobility
measures and a fixed effects logistic regression for the purdah variable. Bootstrap standard errors
reported. The results for the “other” category by caste/religion have been excluded due to small
sample size and non-significant results. All models include controls shown in Table 4 for labor force
participation, family composition, and health. Total N = 14,641 women (29,282 observations).
Source: As for Table 3.
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To examine whether these results are driven by upward or downward mobility,
stratified regressions were conducted on the upwardly and downwardly mobile as two
separate sub-samples. Table 5 displays the wealth coefficient, standard error, and sample size
from separate fixed effects regressions on these two samples. For the measure of the
number of places that the respondent requires a chaperone, there is only a statistically
significant wealth effect for the upwardly mobile. The non-significant coefficient for the
downwardly mobile subsample suggests that a household’s decrease in wealth has no impact
on the number of places that the respondent required a chaperone to visit. In the remaining
regressions, however, neither the coefficient for the upwardly nor the downwardly mobile
reach statistical significance. Therefore, there is only partial evidence that the results are
driven by the upwardly mobile. I cannot rule out that the coefficients in Table 4 are also
picking up on the behavior of downwardly mobile households which may be casting aside
female seclusion practices as they become poorer.
As a test of the robustness of these results, the same models were run using the
absolute asset scale instead of the relative measure (z-score). The findings with this asset
scale, presented in Table 6, reveal similar results to those in Table 4. An increase in absolute
wealth between IHDS I and II is associated with the respondent reporting more places that
she requires a chaperone and permission to go as well as increased likelihood of practicing
purdah.
Several of the control variables show statistically significant results. The respondent’s
labor force participation, household composition, and health are significantly associated with
some of the measures of female seclusion as shown in Table 4. The absence of the
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respondent’s husband and being the senior married woman in the household are both
associated with fewer restrictions on a woman’s physical mobility. The presence of an elder
man in the household is associated with more places that require a chaperone but has no
effect on the other measures. Having a son is associated with less requirement for a
chaperone but more likelihood of practicing purdah. Both paid and unpaid work are
associated with less requirement for a chaperone; however, there are no effects on
permission-asking behavior. Paid work is negatively associated with the practice of purdah.

The withdrawal of women from the labor force may sometimes manifest as a form
of female seclusion. In the primary analysis, I have included labor force participation as a
control; but in Table 7, I examine the relationship between relative asset wealth and women’s
participation in the paid and unpaid labor force. I find a negative relationship between
wealth and the respondent’s participation in the paid labor force and no statistically
significant relationship between wealth and participation in unpaid (non-domestic) work.
The findings indicate that increased wealth between IHDS I and II is associated with
withdrawal of women from the paid labor force. This result is quite striking given that
women’s labor force participation is also linked to the household economic position directly
through her income.
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Table 6: Coefficients from individual fixed effects Poisson and logistic regressions using
absolute asset wealth scale
Number of places (of 3)
the respondent requires
a chaperone to go
permission to go
(1)
(2)

Respondent
practices
purdah
(3)

Asset wealth
(absolute scale 0-30)

0.017***
(0.005)

0.005**
(0.002)

0.021*
(0.010)

Paid work

-0.102**
(0.038)
-0.109**
(0.034)
-0.531***
(0.092)
-0.172***
(0.047)
0.118**
(0.042)
-0.293***
(0.061)
0.201***
(0.051)

-0.008
(0.012)
-0.008
(0.012)
-0.384***
(0.038)
-0.060***
(0.016)
-0.021
(0.015)
-0.015
(0.021)
0.016
(0.019)

-0.193**
(0.071)
0.149*
(0.067)
0.226
(0.184)
-0.131
(0.095)
0.079
(0.086)
0.265*
(0.134)
0.161
(0.094)

-0.243***
(0.028)

-0.038***
(0.009)

0.061
(0.049)

Unpaid work
Husband absent
Respondent is senior woman
Elder man in household
Has son(s)
In poor health
Wave II

Observations
14,924
28,248
6,938
Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Notes: Coefficients are from fixed effects Poisson regressions for Models 1 and 2 and a fixed effect
logistic regression for Model 3. The fixed effects Total N = 14,641 women (29,282 observations).
Source: As for Table 3.

93

Table 7: Coefficients from fixed effects logistic regressions depicting the relationship
between asset wealth and labor force participation
Respondent
does paid work

Asset wealth
(z-score)

(1)

Respondent does
unpaid non-domestic
work
(2)

-0.337***
(0.063)

-0.085
(0.054)

Paid work
Unpaid work
Husband absent
Senior woman in household
Elder man in household
Has son(s)
In poor health
Wave II

-0.147*
(0.065)

-0.130*
(0.063)

0.209
(0.186)
0.125
(0.092)
-0.352***
(0.086)
-0.006
(0.136)
-0.439***
(0.099)

-0.014
(0.156)
-0.078
(0.083)
-0.161*
(0.077)
0.396***
(0.116)
-0.122
(0.089)

0.554***
(0.039)

0.278***
(0.035)

Observations
6,938
7,826
Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Notes: Labor force participation is defined as working at least 250 hours (roughly part-time) in the
past year. Paid work includes wage or salary positions. Unpaid work includes animal husbandry,
contributions to a family business, or unpaid agricultural labor. The fixed effects logistic regression
estimation procedure does not incorporate information about women who did not change their
response to the question. The number of observations varies by outcome variable due to these
restrictions. Total N = 14,641 women (29,282 observations).
Source: As for Table 3.

Results by sub-populations
To test hypotheses 2 through 5, separate fixed effects regressions were conducted on
stratified samples. The asset wealth (z-score) coefficients from these stratified regressions
which include all controls are presented in Table 4. The table can be used to assess which
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sub-populations have statistically significant wealth effects; however, the magnitudes of the
coefficients across the different stratified samples should not be directly compared.
The results stratified by caste and religious community present mixed results across
the three female seclusion measures. There are no statistically significant wealth effects on
female seclusion found for Muslims and Adivasis. Dalit households have statistically
significant positive wealth effects on both measures of women’s physical mobility but nonsignificant wealth effects on purdah. The OBC population has significant positive wealth
effects on whether women require a chaperone but non-significant results on the other
measures. Non-Brahmin forward (upper) castes have positive and statistically significant
wealth effects on purdah practice but non-significant effects for the physical mobility
measures. Brahmins have negative wealth effects on both measures of physical mobility but
the effect only reaches statistical significance in the case of requiring a chaperone. Negative
wealth effects would suggest that upward economic mobility is associated with decreasing
restrictions on women’s physical mobility.
Table 5 also reveals how the wealth mobility effects are stratified by initial wealth.
Statistically significant wealth effects are only found in the poorest quartile for the
requirement of a chaperone and purdah. For the measure capturing the number of places
that a respondent requires permission to go, all wealth quartiles have positive and statistically
significant wealth effects except for the wealthiest group.
The effects stratified by the education level of the female respondent are also
presented in Table 5. For the chaperone variable, the effects only reach statistical
significance for women who have primary school education. This effect is positive
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suggesting that women with this level of education report more restrictions on the number
of places they require a chaperone after their household experiences economic mobility. For
the purdah and permission requirement measures, the fixed effect logistic results are only
statistically significant for women who report having no education. The effects for this
group are positive. Women with higher levels of education (some secondary school or
higher) did not have statistically significant wealth effects on any of the female seclusion
measures.
The final set of results compare the effects for women in rural and urban areas. For
the permission asking measure, there are positive and statistically significant wealth effects
for both rural and urban women. Rural women see a positive and statistically significant
wealth effect on their likelihood of practicing purdah whereas urban women experience a
negative and statistically significant wealth effect on their likelihood of practicing purdah.
There are only statistically significant wealth effects on the number of places the woman
requires a chaperone for rural women. This effect is in a positive direction meaning that
increased wealth was associated with more places which require a chaperone in rural areas.
Discussion
This paper has studied the relationship between household economic mobility and
the practice of female seclusion in India using nationally representative panel data. Following
households over time reveals that gender practices like female seclusion are not always static
features of a household. Instead, the panel data shows that women report significant changes
in restrictions on their physical mobility and the practice of purdah within the seven years
between IHDS I and II.
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There was robust evidence in favor of hypothesis 1 that changes in female seclusion
practices were associated with changes in the household’s economic position. Households
experiencing an increase in relative wealth increased their likelihood of practicing purdah and
placed more restrictions on the physical mobility of women in the household. These results
held even after the inclusion of controls for changes in household composition, health of the
woman, and her labor force participation. At least for the requirement of a chaperone, these
effects appear to be driven by the behaviors of the upwardly mobile rather than the
downwardly mobile. The results validate the observations of ethnographers and classic
theories like Sanskritization which suggest that upwardly mobile households may adopt
female seclusion to signal social status.
However, mobility-induced female seclusion was not found in all of India’s diverse
communities. Stratified analyses presented in Table 5 were used to test hypotheses related to
how wealth effects on female seclusion vary by sub-populations. Limited evidence was
found to support hypothesis 2 which anticipated the effects being concentrated in low and
medium status caste groups. Muslims and Adivasis, groups which may have different cultural
norms on gender practices, did not have any significant wealth effects on female seclusion.
Dalits had statistically significant positive wealth effects on both physical mobility measures
and OBCs had statistically significant positive wealth effects on one of those measures.
Interestingly, it was only non-Brahmin other forward castes which had positive wealth
effects on purdah suggesting that this practice may not have the same perceived association
with status outside of the high-caste community. Most of the literature on female seclusion
as a status marker in South Asia focuses on the practice within the Hindu community so it
was not surprising to find that the predominantly Hindu groups of Dalit, OBC, and non97

Brahmin forward castes were the ones adopting female seclusion as they experienced
economic mobility. However, the results were mixed across the different measures of female
seclusion, suggesting that the discursive meaning of these practices may vary across different
communities.
Hypotheses 3 was supported by the evidence. Households who started out with
lower wealth changed their practice of female seclusion as they experienced economic
mobility. Those already in the highest wealth quintile did not change their gender practices
when they experienced upward mobility. The results by wealth were more consistent across
measures than those by caste and religion suggesting that economic class may be a more
important predictor of this behavior than caste. Analyzing female seclusion by asset wealth
in the cross section reveals an inverse relationship with wealthier households less likely to
practice seclusion. Therefore, the regression results suggest that the process of social
mobility itself is what triggers the adoption of female seclusion and not imitation of the
middle or upper classes. Economic mobility may trigger status anxiety in households as they
seek to assert their new social position. Status through the regulation of women’s bodies
provide a cultural script through which they can assert their new social position using a
language of moral virtue and female modesty. This explains why the upwardly mobile, whose
position remains contested, may behave differently than those in their new social class,
whose position is already established.
There was also evidence to support hypothesis 4 which expected the effects to be
concentrated in the households of women with lower education levels. Women with at least
some secondary school education did not observe any statistically significant wealth effects
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on the female seclusion measures. The results could be both reflective of selection into
higher education levels as well as the effect of educational institutions on the values of
families. Families which value women’s education do not appear to subscribe to the view
that female seclusion is a positive status marker.
There was also partial evidence that wealth effects on female seclusion were a rural
phenomenon. For the permission measure, there were significant positive wealth effects in
both rural and urban areas; but for purdah, the wealth effects were negative and significant
in cities suggesting that upwardly mobile urban households reduce their practice of purdah.
While dominant in rural areas, urban areas may have more competing scripts related to
gender and social status, including Westernization. The negative sign for the wealth effects in
cities suggests that some urban families may ditch female seclusion practices as they advance
economically.
There are several limitations to this study. While fixed effects regression modeling
removes much of the omitted variable bias by focusing on within-individual changes over
time, there remains a possibility that a key time-varying confound has not been included in
the model. In addition, the analysis has only included married women between the ages of 15
and 56 (in IHDS II). The impact of economic mobility on female seclusion practices would
likely be different for girls, older women, and women who are widowed or divorced.
Female seclusion is also a complex and variegated practice which is difficult to
summarize in a quantitative scale or indicator. Each measure used in the analysis captures a
slightly different dimension of female seclusion which explains why the results are not always
consistent across the three measures for each sub-population. For example, Dalits had
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wealth effects on both physical mobility measures but not on purdah. Purdah is a complex
practice that individuals and families may choose to adopt for a variety of different social,
cultural, or religious reasons. In addition, the permission measure suffers from an additional
limitation in that the questions used to form the scale were asked slightly differently in IHDS
II. In the second survey wave, respondents were given a third option which may have
introduced some noise into this measure. This could possibly explain why the results from
this variable sometimes deviate from those of the other two measures.
Finally, the survey data does not permit me to make any claims regarding who within
the household is directing the changing gender practices or what these changes mean to the
families. I am unable to document household disagreement, acts of resistance related to
these practices, or how women feel about the practice. However, qualitative studies have
shown that female seclusion may be imposed by men but also sometimes by women within
the household; furthermore, some women have reported that they personally gain from the
heightened status associated with female seclusion (Mumtaz and Salway 2005; Still 2011).
Future qualitative research can help fill in gaps in our understanding of the discursive
meaning of these practices for women and their families.
Conclusion
The cultural script of status through female seclusion remains a powerful social ideal in
India. The evidence suggest that this cultural framework is especially appealing to some of
the most marginalized groups, including the poor, those living in rural areas, Dalits, and
those with less education. If these groups see their behavior as imitating the ideals of highstatus groups, as Sanskritization theory would suggest, they may be imitating an ideal which
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the elite appear to have discarded (assuming they ever practiced it at higher rates). There are
no significant positive relationships between economic mobility and female seclusion for any
of the highest-status groups by caste or class. In fact, for some of the highest-status groups,
the effects are in the negative direction signaling that these groups are moving away from
seclusion practices. High status groups may have no choice but to seek out alternative scripts
to differentiate their status as lower status groups begin using the cultural schema of
Sanskritization to make moral claims to status (Gould 1961).
India has experienced rapid economic development and a growing middle class over
the past several decades. There has also been an increase in occupational mobility and a
decrease in intergenerational educational persistence for lower caste groups (Azam 2015;
Azam and Bhatt 2015). The findings of this paper suggest that the growing upwardly mobile
population may reach towards female seclusion as a strategy to perform their new status,
including through the withdrawal of women from the labor force. The relationship between
household economic mobility and women’s exit from the labor force, as suggested in Table
7, could help explain India’s low and declining rate of female labor force participation over
the recent period of rapid economic growth (Chatterjee et al. 2018; Lahoti and Swaminathan
2016). What remains to be seen, however, is whether the increase in female seclusion after a
family experiences upward economic mobility will stick. If status anxiety is the cause of
changes in household gender practices, then it may fade as the family becomes comfortable
in their new class position. Also, they may begin to adapt to the gender norms of the Indian
middle class where female seclusion may be less normative. Future research can answer this
question when longitudinal data is available for longer time periods.
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The findings from this paper document how improvements in the economic position
of the household may have adverse effects on the physical mobility of women in that
household. In addition to the possible implications for women’s empowerment, female
seclusion may also exacerbate health inequalities. Research has documented that much of the
gap in hypertension between men and women in India can be explained by seclusion
practices (Stroope 2015) and that women who practice seclusion report lower health
knowledge (Paul 2020). Because gender practices are an essential part of constructing social
boundaries and contesting group status, women often bear a unique burden in performing
household status. It is important for researchers to understand the complex implications that
economic changes may have for gender and family dynamics within the household.
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CHAPTER 5: WORKING WOMEN ON INDIA’S URBAN MARRIAGE MARKET
Abstract
Many marriages in India follow a male breadwinner model resulting in India having one of
the lowest rates of female labor force participation in the world. Despite this pattern, there is
evidence of growing labor force participation among the highest educated women in India’s
metros. This study uses data from 46 interviews conducted in New Delhi to examines how
the urban middle class makes sense of the competing cultural ideals of male breadwinning
and dual earner marriage. Men married to working women frequently report that they were
explicitly looking for a working woman on the arranged marriage market. Women’s careers
were seen as essential to some families because the second income could help insure against
financial instability. Working women, on the other hand, report that they want to work
because their careers provide them with autonomy and a sense of accomplishment.
Countering narratives which idealize the breadwinning household model, dual earning
couples argued that working women make better partners and that shared career experience
helps facilitate a companionate marriage. There was less willingness, however, to challenge
gender roles in the division of household and care work. Dual earner couples employed
patchwork of different strategies to manage household labor including employing domestic
workers and relying on the labor of other female household members.
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How women’s careers impact their experience in finding a marriage partner and their
propensity to marry is an important area of research. An extensive body of research shows
that, in the United States, women’s employment and income are associated with higher
probability of marriage (Van Bavel, Schwartz, and Esteve 2018; Oppenheimer 1997;
Sweeney 2002; White and Rogers 2000). While previously debated, the literature now clearly
shows a pattern of convergence in mate preferences across genders. Both men and women
in heterosexual couples, on average, prefer a partner who is employed and high earning. This
trend suggests a decline in the male breadwinner household model as many families switch
to dual earner households. Despite these changes, evidence continues to show that women
do more housework and care work than men, even in dual earner households and among
those who endorse the ideals of gender egalitarianism, and that this gap increases after the
couple have children (Daminger 2020; Fuwa 2004; Milkie et al. 2002).
The relationship between women’s careers and their experience on the marriage
market, while studied extensively in Western industrialized countries, is less understood in
some other social contexts such as in setting where arranged marriage is dominant. Arranged
marriage, where parents or other kin select their child’s marriage partner, remains common
in many African and Asian countries. In arranged marriages, characteristics such as women’s
occupation and their intention to work after marriage may be used as filters to sort potential
matches. Rather than being a topic that is negotiated within a couple in a romantic
relationship, women’s career intentions may serve as a prerequisite to initiating plans for
marriage.
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This study examines how the urban middle class in India think about the postmarriage careers of highly skilled women on the marriage market. India is an interesting
setting to study working women not only because arranged marriage is widely practiced in
India; but also, because the country has one of the lowest rates of female labor force
participation in the world. Less than a third of Indian women are in the labor force (Lahoti
and Swaminathan 2016). Highly skilled dual earner couples are a tiny minority of the overall
Indian population. These couples must contend with a dominant cultural narrative of male
breadwinning and gender specialization within marriage. Using interviews with dual career
couples, supplemented with interviews with unmarried people and parents, this study seeks
to understand how this segment of the urban middle class thinks about women’s careers.
This chapter documents why some of New Delhi’s middle class choose dual breadwinning
and how dual career families manage work and family responsibilities.
Women’s labor force participation in India
Compared to other countries, India ranks among the bottom in terms of percent of women
in the labor force due to the fact that there has been no growth in the female workforce for
several decades (Lahoti and Swaminathan 2016). Conservative social norms which restrict
women to the home have frequently been examined as a primary driver of the low rates of
women’s employment (Bernhardt et al. 2018; Jayachandran 2020); however, several
quantitative studies have found limited evidence that norms are the primary factor keeping
women out of the labor force (Das and Desai 2003; Deshpande and Kabeer 2019). Other
important factors limiting women’s labor force participation documented in the literature
include discrimination, low demand for women’s labor, transportation/safety concerns, and
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gender segregation of the labor market (Chatterjee and Vanneman 2022; Das and Desai
2003; Deshpande and Singh 2021; Lei et al. 2019; Sarkar, Sahoo, and Klasen 2019).
In addition, there is a widely documented U-shaped relationship between women’s
education and labor force participation in India (Chatterjee et al. 2018; Chatterjee and
Vanneman 2022). The highest rates of female labor force participation are found among the
lowest and highest educated women. The unusually low rates of labor force participation of
the growing population of moderately educated women appear to be driven by occupation
segregation as women are often excluded from the white-collar clerical and sales jobs that
are common for people with this skill level (Chatterjee and Vanneman 2022). College
educated women have higher rates of labor force participation and there is evidence of
growth in their labor force participation over time (Datta Gupta et al. 2020). The expansion
of modern services like Information Technology (IT) and financial intermediation in large
metros like New Delhi has contributed to a growing female high-skilled labor force
(Mehrotra and Parida 2017). Despite overall lower rates of female labor force participation in
urban areas, college educated women in cities have relatively high participation. Data from
the India Human Development Survey shows that labor force participation increased for
college educated married women aged 29-59 in the Delhi metro from 20.9% in 2004-5 to
29.1% in 2011-12. While this rate of participation is low by international standards, it is
substantially higher than the participation of non-college educated women. In the same time
period and region, the labor force participation of non-college educated married women
aged 29-59 increased from only 12.4% to 17.2%.
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Marriage and women’s careers
Marital status is one of the most important predictors of women’s labor force participation
in the Indian context. Marriage is associated with a larger decline in Indian women’s labor
force participation than motherhood (Deshpande and Kabeer 2019; Deshpande and Singh
2021; Fletcher et al. 2018). In fact, there is limited evidence of a motherhood penalty on
wages for Indian women (Deshpande and Singh 2021). The importance of marriage in
suppressing women’s labor force participation suggests that many families embrace a
breadwinner-housewife household model. Qualitative studies from rural India have
documented strong preferences for a male breadwinner household model to such an extent
that both husband and wife may downplay women’s work outside of the home (Rao 2012).
Studies in urban and semi-urban areas have documented that women are often willing to
give up their careers at the time of marriage to conform to ideals of respectable femininity
through the prioritization of family over career (Radhakrishnan 2009; Vijayakumar 2013).
Survey evidence suggests that the male breadwinner household model is supported
by a sizeable minority of the Indian population. A recent study by Pew found that 43% of
Indians felt that only men should be responsible for earning for the household (Pew
Research Center 2022). A majority of households supported the idea that earning money was
the responsibility of both men and women. Those with higher education were more likely
see women as also responsible for household earnings. Only 33% of college educated
Indians supported the idea that men were responsible for earning (Pew Research Center
2022).
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Given the importance of marriage in suppressing women’s employment, it is
valuable to examine how working women fair on the marriage market. In the early 2000s as
many as 90% of Indian marriages were either arranged or semi-arranged (Allendorf and
Pandian 2016). Increasingly, families use online matrimonial websites to sort and filter
potential marriage partners by characteristics such as caste, occupation, income, family
background, and physical appearance (Kaur and Dhanda 2014). An analysis of online
arranged marriage matrimonial profiles found that many women present themselves in their
profiles as both career- and family-oriented, combining traditional and modern values
(Titzmann 2011). And yet, a recent survey experiment using online matrimonial profiles
found that women who indicated a desire to work after marriage received less interest for
their profiles (Dhar 2021). This suggests that the portion of potential grooms looking for a
working woman as a partner might be smaller than the portion who prefer women to not
work after marriage.
However, career experience and training may still hold value to grooms even if
women do not continue their career after marriage. An ethnographic study from Pakistan
found that women with medical credentials are highly valued on the marriage market; but
that some men do not want their doctor brides to work after marriage (Masood 2019b).
While doctors potential earnings are a factor in their desirability, men and their families were
sometimes more interested in the cultural and social capital that she may bring to her marital
home because of her medical training (Masood 2019b). Doctors were also seen as less
quarrelsome and more respectable than other women on the marriage market (Masood
2019b). In India, analysis also suggests that some women may be completing higher levels of
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education to increase their position on the marriage market rather than the labor market
(Klasen and Pieters 2013).
Since much of the literature on how women’s careers impact their position on the
marriage market uses quantitative data, little is known about how men and their families
actually think about women’s careers and weigh the pros and cons of her employment after
marriage. In addition, much of the literature has focused on the problems of stagnating or
declining labor force participation in rural areas and among moderately skilled women. Less
attention has been given to understanding the attitudes of the highly skilled urban middle
class, among which higher rates of dual earning couples can be found. This study aims to fill
these gaps by focusing on the experiences of dual earner middle class couples in New Delhi
and the attitudes of the middle class towards these less-traditional family work arrangements.
Data and methods
Data for this study comes from 46 semi-structured interviews conducted with middle-class
people residing in the New Delhi metro region, including recently married or engaged
people, unmarried people, and parents. For the purpose of this study, middle class was
defined as the respondent or child(ren) of the respondent, in the case of the parents, having
or currently pursuing a college degree. The majority of the interviews were conducted with
recently married or engaged individuals (28 interviews) from 15 different sex couples where
the woman was either currently working or searching for employment. In addition, 18
interviews with parents and young people approaching marriageable age provided valuable
additional perspectives on the topic of women’s careers. A separate semi-structured
interview schedule was used for each of the three populations interviewed which covered
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attitudes towards and experiences with marriage. Respondents were asked about their beliefs
regarding the household division of labor, women’s careers, and what they were looking for
in a marriage partner.
Respondents were recruited through a number of different strategies. Unmarried
young people and parents were recruited primarily through contacting households which had
participated in a 2016 representative survey in the Delhi metro region. In addition, a few
unmarried respondents were recruited through approaching young people near a college
campus. Some of the unmarried young adult and parent interviews were conducted with the
respondent alone; but, in other cases, respondents were interviewed in small groups. The
groups included when the mother and father were interviewed together and also small
groups of unmarried siblings or friends who asked to be interviewed as a group. These group
interviews provided additional insights into how people spoke with each other about the
topics of marriage and women’s careers. The unmarried young people interviewed ranged in
age from 18 to 29 and half were women. The parents interviewed included 7 mothers and 5
fathers.
Recruitment of recently married or engaged individuals required a different
approach. College-educated different-sex couples who had been married or engaged within
the past four years were identified through snowballing. Recruitment texts were shared on
the WhatsApp messaging app widely across the researcher’s social network. In addition,
recruitment posts were made in a number of closed Facebook Delhi neighborhood groups.
Interview respondents also suggested other couples they knew who had recently married.
This chapter focuses on the experiences of 15 couples where the woman partner was either
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currently employed or searching for employment. From these couples, 15 women and 13
men agreed to be interviewed regarding their marriage and beliefs about women’s work.
Each individual was interviewed alone and separate from their spouse. While the majority of
the 15 couples self-described their marriage as arranged or semi-arranged, five of the couples
described their marriage as a “love marriage,” a term used in India for marriages preceded by
a romantic relationship. Most of the couples were dual earner; however, two of the women
were currently unemployed but planning to re-enter the workforce once they found a
position in their industry. In addition, in one couple, the husband was not currently
employed but currently pursuing studies. Many of the couples had been married less than a
year so, while most couples reported plans for children, only four couples had any children
at the time of the interview.
This study focuses on the college-educated middle class. The recently married
respondents had at least a bachelor’s degree and some had obtained higher levels of
education. Not all of the parents had college degrees, but they had all provided a college
education to their children. About half of the unmarried respondents were current college
students. The interview respondents were primarily employed in white collar professions
such as medicine, IT, management, business, and law. The participants in the study reflect
the diversity of the urban middle class in Delhi in terms of caste and religion. The plurality
of respondents were upper caste Hindus. There were also several respondents each from the
Sikh, Muslim, and Jain religion as well as Hindus from lower status castes including the
oppressed caste community of Dalits (also known as Scheduled Castes), and Other
Backward Classes (a government defined category often referred to as OBC). Gender norms
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and rates of female employment vary by caste and religion in India; however, this paper
focuses on findings that were not restricted to one religious or caste community interviewed.
All of the interviews were conducted face-to-face between July 2018 and March 2019
in either Hindi or English. A female Indian research assistant attended all interviews with the
author. Most interviews took place either in the home of the respondent or in a coffee shop.
All but one of the interviews were audio-recorded. The audio data was then transcribed and
translated into English by the research assistant. The transcripts were analyzed using the
ATLAS.ti software. First, all sections of the interviews relating to gender and work were
coded thematically. Next, the coded data was analyzed and grouped into themes such as
“working women are better partners” and “using women’s income” to identify emerging
findings. I then examined the data for disconfirming evidence on the key emerging findings.
In the text, pseudonyms are used, and small details (like place names) have also been
changed to protect study participant privacy.
Looking for a second income on the marriage market
Many middle-class men and parents were explicitly searching for a working woman on the
marriage market. They often expressed a desire for a dual-earner household because of the
lifestyle that the second income would facilitate. Ruchita was a mother of one unmarried son
who described herself as a housewife. In regard to what she was looking for in a wife for her
son, she explained that “for me, it’s most important that she have a job, and that the both of
them work and earn together so that they can run a nice household for themselves. … All I
want is a girl who works, I don’t want anything else.” Ruchita later went on to explain that
her preference for a working daughter-in-law even superseded her desire to find a spouse
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within their caste. However, she did have limits to her caste openness; “We won’t go too
low, though” she clarified. While she was willing to consider options outside of their caste if
the woman was working, she explained that she would not accept a match from a Dalit
(oppressed caste) or Adivasi (tribal/indigenous) community.
The men interviewed, whose wives were all working or searching for employment,
mostly expressed that they intentionally sought a dual earner relationship. In fact, many of
the men interviewed said that a woman’s career was the primary factor in their search for a
marriage partner. Like the parents interviewed, many men discussed the value that a second
income could have for their lifestyle. Danish, who had an arranged marriage, had explicitly
sought out a working woman explaining, “I have no preferences for beauty, no preferences
for anything, but the only preference was that she should be educated, and she should be
working, that’s it.” He and his wife both worked in the management sector and, though they
planned for it, had not yet had any children. Danish explained his reasoning for looking for a
wife who would work after marriage:
If I got married, is it possible for me to fulfill our dreams or requirements
with this much of salary? I think no… I just don’t want to compromise on
anything because such things may create a problem later on because we
can’t buy this, we can’t buy that because of financial reasons. I just don’t
want that.
Without a second income, Danish feared that he would not be able to live the lifestyle he
wanted to live. He further explained that it did not matter to him if the income came from
himself or his wife. The only important thing to Danish was the lifestyle that their combined
income afforded.
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Amar, who also had an arranged marriage, felt similarly about having a second
income for the household. He had been married for over two years and had one child with
his wife, Tripti, who had a management position at a large Indian corporation. Amar was a
medical professional who ran a small neighborhood clinic. Like Danish, Amar said that a
woman’s career was the primary criteria he used while searching for a wife. When asked the
reason why a woman’s career was his primary criteria, he said, “the income would be
double… in Delhi you have to… You can manage in a small place, but… in a metropolitan
city, you need a working woman, and then, what is she going to do at home? If I’m in my
native place then there are lots of things to do, here there isn’t as much work [in the home].”
Amar’s skepticism about whether there was enough housework to justify keeping his wife
out of the labor force was shared by other respondents and is described later in this chapter.
The interviews with recently married women also echoed this view that working
women were valuable on the marriage market because of their income. Tripti, who was
married to Amar, explained that potential grooms “were happy…because I was earning
good, so [my] money was not a thing that [harmed me on the marriage market], rather it was
something that made them what to marry me.” Tripti, who was the primary earner in her
household due to her high-powered position at a large Indian corporation, recognized that
her high income was seen as an asset by potential grooms and their parents. To many
middle-class families, women’s income was viewed as integral to achieving a comfortable
middle-class lifestyle in the increasingly expensive city.
Men in love marriages spoke similarly about the value of women’s careers, including
how a second income would increase their household’s standard of living. When Siddharth, a
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lawyer who had married his girlfriend of eight years, was asked about whether there was ever
any discussion about his wife not working after marriage, he laughed. He said, “I always
wanted her to work. It’s a good thing. Income will come in… two extra bucks.” Since they
had graduated college together, both Siddharth and his partner Apurva had worked full-time.
The thought of her leaving the labor force and them relying solely on his income was
something he explained that he “never” wanted.
Women’s income as protection from negative economic shocks
In addition to elevating the overall standard of living of the household, several men and
parents expressed the necessity of a second earner as a form of protection from financial
precarity. Their justification of this view often centered on fears about the instability and
unpredictability of the economy especially for those employed in India’s growing private
sector. Vaishnavi, a doctor and mother of an unmarried son and daughter, did not feel that it
was necessary for her son’s wife to work. Instead, she said, “it’s definitely very important
that she be educated enough that, if they go through bad times, God forbid that happen…
she should be able to help out.”
Both men and their parents rejected the idea that men were solely responsible for the
finances of the household. Nimrit, a housewife and mother of three unmarried sons, shared
a similar sentiment to Vaishnavi. She said, “if the children have any problems, any troubles
in the future, she should be able to support them. It shouldn’t be like if the man is facing
problems, the woman can’t do anything except sit silently at home.” While neither mother
felt that employment was necessary, in contrast to other mothers like Ruchita, both
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Vaishnavi and Nimrit felt that it was essential that their daughter-in-law be able to contribute
to the household financially if the family faced financial distress.
Concerns about financial instability were often influenced by the respondents’ own
experiences or those of people they knew. Danish, who was quoted above discussing how a
second income could help him to live the lifestyle he wanted in Delhi, explained that his
beliefs about the value of women’s careers were influenced by experiences within his family.
He said:
One of my uncles died… he was the only earning member… they had two
kids… after that my grandfather… had to take care of each and every
thing… the kids have suffered a lot because they don’t have that much
money. I have seen that they can’t celebrate birthdays because [of money] ...
my aunt is a homemaker... she doesn’t have a strong education… she was
not having the [qualifications required for] someone to hire her… I thought
that if something happens to me, I don’t want my wife to suffer just
because she can’t work and is not educated… I can bear anything, but I
don’t want that situation to occur to my wife.
His aunt’s experience left a large impression on Danish, leading him to shape his whole
search for a partner around finding a career woman. Despite these limited criteria, Danish
encountered some issues in finding a working woman on the arranged marriage market as
some women he met seemed to not be interested in maintaining a career after marriage. He
even rejected one potential match because he felt her short-term contractual job signaled
that she was not very attached to the labor force. Ultimately, he found the perfect partner in
his wife Reena, a woman with a well-established career in management who even worked in
the same neighborhood of multi-national corporate offices where he was employed.
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Women see employment as providing autonomy and self-fulfillment
While men and parents often spoke about the financial value of women’s careers for the
household, employed women emphasized the value of their careers as providing a sense of
personal satisfaction and autonomy. The women interviewed rarely discussed the financial
aspects of dual-career households. When they did discuss finances, they often spoke about
how they wanted to have their own income which they would have full discretion over.
Many women, like Kavita, an 18-year-old unmarried college, wanted to be able to give
money to her parents:
I really want to have a career before I get married. I want to stand on my
own two feet, because I don’t want to depend on anyone… I want to do
my own business, and then I want to earn enough money to take care of
[my parents], and that way my husband can’t say anything to me, because if
I use his money, he’ll tell me that I’m spending his money on my parents,
that I’m not spending time with his parents… when one is earning one’s
own money, we can come and go as we like, spend time with our family
whenever we want to.
Kavita saw employment as closely tied to power dynamics within a marriage. One of the
reasons she wanted to have a career was so that she could have the autonomy to make her
own decisions and control her own finances.
Historically, there have been taboos on parents accepting financial support from
their daughters since this was seen as the responsibility of sons. As fertility has declined in
India, there is evidence of increasing social acceptability of receiving financial assistance
from daughters (Allendorf 2020). However, several working women interviewed still felt that
their desire to give money to their parents was not accepted by many potential grooms on
the marriage market. Jyoti, a doctor, explained that one of the most common reasons that
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potential husbands rejected her was that they refused to allow her to support her parents
financially after marriage. Jyoti explained why she chose her current husband for an arranged
marriage, saying “I’m an only child, I don’t have any sibling… so I talked to him [about how
I didn’t want to get married] because I think I should take responsibility for my parents… he
said… I will take care of your parents as well, and if you earn, whatever you will earn, you
can give that money to your parents.” This promise of support to her parents as they aged
was a major factor in why Jyoti elected to marry her husband.
In addition to having control over their own income, the employed women
interviewed frequently expressed that, through their career, they could feel empowered and
find a sense of accomplishment. Bhavna, a woman who had an arranged marriage only a
month before our interview, explained that she wanted to work after her marriage, “I want
to have that freedom. That feels good, to have your own money, that gives you…
independence... and a sense of stability, that you have something of your own, it gives you a
self-satisfaction.” Bhavna’s marriage had led to her relocating to New Delhi from a smaller
city. While she had not yet found a job in the city, she said that she had spoken with her
husband before their marriage about her desire to work. One of the things she had liked
about him as a potential husband was that he told her that he did not want her to “waste her
talents” from her training in accounting and business.
A career was also described as a way to develop an identity separate from their
husbands. Preeti, a woman who had an arranged marriage, had left her manager position at
the time of marriage because she had to relocate to New Delhi. Shortly after marriage, she
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began working full-time to manage the business her husband had recently opened. However,
she recently decided to leave this job and get another job in management explaining:
I wanted to do something of my own. I don’t want to ask for money from
my parents or my husband, that is why I started [a new job]. I have [our
business], … but it is considered a joint [business venture between my
husband and I]…there is nothing of my own [in the business], so that is
why I want something only of my own.
Preeti hoped that her new job and separate salary would give her something that was all her
own, not tied to her husband or her husband’s family.
While some men and their families preferred a working woman, many others would
refuse potential brides who insisted on maintaining their career after marriage. For some
women and their families, this made the search for a suitable groom a difficult one. Kavya
had been married in an arranged marriage and had one child. She had faced difficulty on the
marriage market in finding a husband who would accept her law career within her
conservative caste community. This struggle to find the right person led her search for a
partner to extend until she was 31 when she finally married Aditya, a man from her caste
who supported her decision to work after marriage. She explained that many potential
matches rejected her because of her insistence on continuing to practice law after marriage.
According to her, “they were not [agreeing to] let me work because they said that we have
enough money so why do you want to work? I said money is not the matter, I want to go
out from the house.” Ultimately her insistence on working after marriage led her to turn
down marriage proposals from a few wealthy families because they came with the stipulation
that she would not be allowed to work outside of the home. She decided, instead, to accept a
proposal from Aditya, who was not employed at the time of their marriage. She explained
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that “I would rather eat less. I don’t want to be with the richest person… I want to earn for
myself.” For Kavya and many of the working women interviewed, maintaining their careers
was about personal autonomy and self-fulfillment and not necessarily about increasing their
standard of living.
Working women are viewed as better partners
One thing that both employed women and their partners frequently agreed on was that
working women made better partners. This belief was common in dual-earner households
that were established through either love or arranged marriage. Countering narratives which
idealize traditional gender roles, these couples argued that a shared understanding, fostered
by similar career experiences, was a stronger basis for a successful marriage. Some men
emphasized the importance of finding a partner who could relate to the high-pressure
environment of their careers in the corporate sector. Kartik was a management professional
who had been married in a hybrid love/arranged marriage. His wife also worked in
management. He said that he wanted a woman who would be “independent” and
understood the pressures of his career:
I don’t want a housewife…. I want to share everything with her… she can
complement me…I work in a corporate culture… I have to do something
of my own, but I need some person who can pat me on the back, who can
give me support.…I had that idea in my mind, like I have to find some
independent girl, so maybe she will understand me better.
According to Kartik, he had two lives, one with his parents in their hometown, where his
parents had no understanding of the aspirations and pressures of his corporate job, and a
second life in Delhi where his life was often consumed by work. He wanted a partner to
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share his life in Delhi, especially through providing comfort and encouragement during
times of work stress. He was convinced that only a woman also working in the corporate
sector could empathize with his experiences. He elected for a love marriage because he felt
that his parents would not be able to find a woman to match him career-wise and in life
outlook. Though he had faced some hurdles to marrying his longtime girlfriend Naina, he
was happy with his choice to fight for the relationship because he felt that, in her, he had
found the ideal partner who understood him.
In addition to being able to provide better emotional support, working women were
believed to be more understanding of their husband’s work commitments than housewives.
Arjun, who worked in the management sector who had an arranged marriage to a woman
also working in management, said that “in your professional life, she can understand the
problems you face, like I’m not coming home on time, or I am stuck in some office calls, or
other office issues, a working women will understand you better than a non-working
[woman.]”
For some men, the desire to find a woman with a career also meant that they sought
to find a woman working in the same field as them. To Pranav, an unmarried man studying
medicine, it was very important to find a wife who also practiced medicine. Pranav explained
that he would feel more “comfortable with [my] own profession” because “if she is from a
different profession, she won’t understand how emergencies work and if I’m getting late in
the night, she will get angry at me.” Pranav went on to explain that his cousin was often
“crying and shouting” at her husband for missing family events because of his unpredictable
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schedule as a hospital-based doctor. He felt that through choosing a fellow doctor for his
wife, he could avoid the issues that he had seen in his cousin’s marriage.
Women also spoke about how shared work experience could help build
understanding between a couple. Reena, who was married to Danish quoted earlier, worked
in the fast-paced management sector. She shared that:
I think… working…helps you to build a relationship with your husband…
because he understands the situation you are going through with office
pressure and he knows everything because he is also working. But when
you are staying at home and you are a housewife, your husband never
knows how many things you are doing, what work you have done, whatever
you are going through, because he is never at home while you are
working… if the girl is working, then the marriage probably would go
better… if she is a housewife, sometime [there are] some conflicts… if she
is working, she is very confident about everything, she can fight… so that
would be good I think.
From Reena’s perspective, a working woman would have more confidence and ability to
speak directly with her husband and advocate for herself. Not only do respondents like
Reena prefer a dual career marriage, but as Reena’s quote reveals, they think the more
traditional marriage based on gender specialization will be less successful than the one based
on shared career experiences.
Some people interviewed held negative opinions about housewives which contrasted
with their positive opinions of employed women. Some respondents spoke about
housewives in a dismissive way, stating that housewives were idle or “sitting at home” all
day. A few shared anecdotes of unhappy or “drama”-prone housewives, often used to justify
their view that employed women made better partners. For example, Veer explained that:
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I don’t want any housewife, because a person gets very lonely… all day you
have to sit here, waiting for when I will come… an empty mind is the
devil’s workshop… I always wanted my partner to work somewhere… My
sister-in-law doesn’t work…. All the time she is sitting at home, so she’s
always like thinking negative.
Veer described his views on his sister-in-law, who he explained had experienced
interpersonal conflicts with her husband and in-laws when her husband lost his business.
The experience had made an impact on Veer’s family and their views on working women.
Veer’s wife Piya explained in her interview that she believed the experience had made them
more open to Veer’s inter-religious love marriage to a working woman. Veer and Piya met at
work where they were both employed for the same large company. Veer was a Sikh and Piya
was a Hindu. According to Piya, Veer’s family felt that:
If [Veer’s sister-in-law] would have been working then she would have
supported her husband in the situation where he was in a [financial] loss,
then she could have done something for her husband, but she didn’t. So
that was the reason [Veer’s parents] wanted us to be independent. The
wanted me… and Veer to work so that we could support each other.
Piya’s description of the impact of Veer’s brothers’ financial struggles again emphasizes the
concern that single-earner households are too vulnerable to economic shocks. To them, dual
breadwinning was seen as a way to insure against financial precarity.
Traditional gender roles persist in the distribution of housework and care work
The couples interviewed all deviated from a breadwinner housewife ideal through embracing
women’s careers; however, in many of the couples, housework and care work continued to
be seen as the responsibility of women. Dual earner couples employed a number of
strategies to manage their careers with the demands of home life. The most common
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strategies utilized by the urban middle-class families interviewed were employing domestic
workers in the home and having other relatives of the husband do the bulk of the household
work. In both cases, this labor remained feminized as the domestic workers and family
members who did this work were usually women. The reliance of the Indian urban middle
class on hired domestic helpers, who are primarily lower class and caste women, has been
documented by Ray and Qayum (2009). In some households, however, husbands made
meaningful contributions to the household work or childcare.
Some dual earner couples rely on the husband’s mother to do most or all of the
household labor and childcare during weekdays. Shreya, a woman recently married in a love
marriage, was employed in the management sector. She described herself as very ambitious
in her career. In describing herself and what she was looking for in a marriage, she explained
that “I need a guy who is as much career-oriented as I am. I am self-driven, I’m an
independent person.” Shreya described how she had already created a checklist of what she
needed in a husband in order for her career to not be negatively impacted by marriage and
having children. The most important criteria she was looking for was a joint family, a family
structure where they would live with her husband’s parents. She explained that:
In my situation it was a little easy because they already have a daughter-inlaw of the elder brother and she’s already working and there’s a child also,
so they were kind of already equipped… I already have parents who can
look after my kid…that was the major reason why I wanted to get married
into a joint family…my kids can have that kind of a, you know, family
support so that they don’t have to go to a creche… someone who… would
take care of my kids as much as I would, so that’s one of my major
checklist points.
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Shreya, who was an only child and grew up in a nuclear family, wanted to marry into a jointfamily with multi-generational co-residence because she felt that the built-in support from
the in-laws for childcare would be essential to her being able to stay in the labor force after
having children. She had come to this conclusion after having watched some women in her
company forced to leave their jobs after having children because they could not manage the
demands of childcare. Shreya’s household also employed domestic workers for more
routinized household cleaning and cooking tasks. She explained that the men in her family,
including her husband, contributed little to nothing in terms of household tasks so the
support of her mother-in-law was essential. Khanna and Pandey (2020) also found evidence
in survey data that mothers-in-law often facilitate their daughter-in-law’s career through
sharing the burden of household production.
Many couples interviewed employed a similar strategy to Shreya’s family, where
household and care work tasks were divided between female household members and an
employed domestic helper. Vinay and Sunita had relocated to Delhi for Vinay’s job in the
media industry. They had been married recently after dating for ten years and overcoming
opposition from Sunita’s parents to their inter-caste love marriage. Sunita was currently
searching for full-time employment in her industry. She was trained as a scientist and had
previously worked in a laboratory before moving to New Delhi. Vinay’s older sister and her
child were also living with them. His sister’s husband was working outside of the country.
Vinay and Sunita did not yet have any children. When asked about who does household
work, Vinay explained that
“The housework is actually divided between the two of them. I don’t do a
lot of housework… I do some of it. I’m lazy about it, but I do some of it.
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[Sunita] is crazy about housework, ‘this should be like this, this should be
like that’… I do very little, but then the maid is there, my sister is there, so
there isn’t actually a lot of housework.”
Vinay and Sunita’s household division of labor, where all of the women in the household
share the housework but men contribute little, was common among the dual earner couples
interviewed.
In some dual earner couples, however, men make meaningful contributions to the
household and care work. Tripti was employed in a management position in a large Indian
corporation. She had been married to Amar, quoted earlier, in an arranged marriage a few
years before our interview. They had one child together. Amar’s career in medicine, where
he managed a private clinic, was more flexible and involved fewer hours of work than his
wife’s. Tripti, who was the primary earner in her household, explained how Amar and his
parents had stepped up to take on more of the household responsibilities to support Tripti’s
career:
[I spend] three point five hours me on road [commuting every day]. I leave
by 7 o’clock, so I wanted someone who’ll [help out], so he’ll wake up, he’ll
cook breakfast for us, he’ll pack breakfast for me… so he’ll do everything
for me in the morning, then he’ll sleep again, then he’ll wake up and pack
his own breakfast… I wanted somebody who could do these things on his
own… most people would expect this from the wife… it would have been
very difficult for me, doing both the things,… because when I am outside
my house for around thirteen to fourteen hours [a day], it is difficult to give
equal time and effort to the family also, when my in-laws come, my
mother-in-law… doesn’t expect me to cook … she helps me with most of
the things… I wanted somebody who could understand this and help out.
By prioritizing her career, Amar and his parents deviate from traditional norms which dictate
that respectable women place their family first and career second.
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Another couple with a fairly equal division of household labor were Ayesha and
Rahul, an interreligious couple who had a love marriage several years prior to our interviews.
They did not have any children yet but planned to have them in the future. Ayesha was an
artist entrepreneur and Rahul worked in business. Ayesha described their division of
household labor:
The kitchen is my department, because he doesn’t know how to do
anything, but he helps me to cut vegetables, and everything else, tidying the
house, washing the clothes, whatever other chores are there, [Rahul] does
them. I’ve never washed clothes in my whole life, before my marriage, my
father used to wash my clothes, and after marriage, [Rahul] washes them.
Ayesha and Rahul did not employ any domestic helpers in their home because, as Rahul
explained, they did not like food cooked by other people. Instead, the managed their
household labor through assigning specific tasks to each other. This continued a pattern of
division of labor that Ayesha had grown up seeing between her parents.
While many women, such as Ayesha, reported being satisfied with the division of
household labor in the home, other women were extremely frustrated by the struggle to
juggle career and household responsibilities. Geeta, a woman working in IT who had been
married in an arranged marriage for over a year, felt burdened by extra work in the home.
She described what she saw as an unfair situation for today’s working women on the
marriage market:
Now what they want is that financially she should contribute equally, plus,
she should have housewife qualities as well, so the combination is not good,
in today’s scenario… I think, that is not [fair] for a girl….it is difficult,
because we are working equally, we are earning equally, why would we do
extra?
127

Geeta, who had left her high paying job on an employment visa in the United States to
marry Neel and return to India where her earnings were lower, was frustrated with Neel’s
unwillingness to do any household chores. While they did employ a cook in their home,
Geeta was still tasked with a number of household responsibilities including supervising and
managing the cook’s work. The management of domestic helpers has been identified in
other studies as a responsibility primarily delegated to women (Cheung and Lui 2021). Geeta
also complained that, though he made more money than her, Neel’s job in management
required fewer work hours than her software development job. She was angry that she had
to do household tasks after her long workdays while Neel was able to relax. While Neel
agreed that many things had changed in India in terms of gender relations, he admitted that:
I still feel that there are many things, in India,… that should be handled by
men, handled by us, and having said that, that in no way should hinder the
professional life of a woman… but I think the [home] management piece
has to be by the woman, it necessarily doesn’t mean cooking part because
these days everyone has cooks and all that stuff but to manage them itself is
a task.
Geeta and Neel differed in their views on the gender division of labor in the household
which had led to significant tensions and dissatisfaction with the marriage. However, Geeta
said that she had no intention to ever leave the labor force, even after having children:
Financial independence and the work thing, that … is very important to
me. No matter how many responsibilities or domestic chores get dumped
into my shoulder… it’s that financially having a different identity, by your
own name, is very important, so that I’ll always do, even… after kids.
Geeta, like many of the interview respondents, had not yet had any children so it remains
unclear how childrearing would impact her career. However, she indicated that she was
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determined to remain in the labor force after having children because of how much she
valued the independence that her career provided her.
Discussion
This study has focused on the experiences and attitudes of a small minority of the Indian
population, dual earner couples in the urban middle class. Using interviews with these
couples, supplemented with interviews with unmarried people and parents, this study reveals
how families manage work and family responsibilities and how they explain their preference
for dual breadwinning within the wider Indian context where gender specialization and male
breadwinning norms are strong. For some men and their parents, women’s career intentions
after marriage appear to be a major factor on which families sort and filter potential options
on the arranged marriage market. Some even reported that women’s employment was the
most important trait they were looking for in a wife. This is because women’s careers could
provide their household with both a second income and insurance in case of financial
instability. For employed women, their desire to work after marriage rarely had to do with
the household standard of living. Instead, they reported that they valued their careers
because it gave them autonomy and a sense of accomplishment.
The popularity of the dual earner household described by the respondents should be
considered within the context of dramatic changes to the economic circumstance of the
Indian middle class. Not only has the size of the middle class expanded but it has also
become less economically stable since the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991.
Over the past few decades, the share of the middle class employed in the government sector
has dwindled as the share working for private companies or self-employed has increased
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(Kapur 2020). In the past, the coveted government job, with its lifetime job security, health
insurance and old age pension, easily supported a male breadwinner household model. The
new economic reality of the growing middle class is one of instability and precarity (Kapur
2017). It is becoming increasingly difficult for the high-skilled professional middle class in
cities like New Delhi to maintain a male-breadwinner-style household. Economic precarity
and fear of losing class status create a context of middle class anxiety in urban India (Dickey
2012).
This concern for economic precarity comes out clearly in the interviews from both
men and their parents. To them, women’s incomes are often needed in order to keep up
with the increasingly costly middle-class lifestyle within India’s urbanizing metros. More
importantly, families hoped that a second income could help insure against job loss or other
negative economic shocks. Often their views on women’s careers were influenced by
watching families in their community struggle to weather economic shocks with a single
income-earner. To many middle-class families, college-educated women employed in Delhi’s
growing IT and financial services sector are especially attractive on the arranged marriage
market because of their high earnings.
This study has also contributed to a growing literature on the rise of an ideology of
companionate marriage within the urban middle class in India. Several authors have
documented the hybridization of arranged and love marriage practices as families
increasingly value emotional compatibility between the partners (Donner 2016; Fuller and
Narasimhan 2008; Netting 2010). Within the urban middle class in Hyderabad, Gilbertson
(Gilbertson 2014) finds a move away from marriage as a hierarchical relationship into one
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based on friendship. This study adds to this literature by showing that, to many in the Delhi
middle-class, women’s careers are believed to help facilitate companionate marriage by
setting up a relationship based on shared experiences and equality. Countering a traditional
narrative which idealizes housewives and gender specialization, many of the middle-class
respondents characterized working women as better partners. In particular, career women
were portrayed as better able to empathize with the stresses of men’s jobs in the increasingly
cut-throat private sector.
The interviews suggested that the urban middle class may be less willing to challenge
gender roles in the distribution of household and care work than they are willing to accept
women’s paid employment after marriage. In some of dual earner households, often those
where women were high-earning, men contributed to the household and care work. This
finding fits with the work of Luke et al. (2014) which documented that women’s earnings
and employment altered household bargaining over the distribution of housework tasks.
However, overall, men’s contributions were small and, in many cases, nonexistent. Women
were viewed as responsible for the management of the household work. To manage the
competing responsibilities at work and home, women in the urban middle class employ
female domestic workers and lean on the help of other female household members. In doing
so, the gendered nature of this labor remains unchallenged.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Using data from 48 interviews and two different surveys, this study presents new findings
related to partner selection and gender dynamics within Indian families. The dissertation is
divided into two parts. Chapters 2 and 3, which form the first part of the dissertation,
provide context to understand India’s outlier status in terms of the persistence of arranged
marriage. Much of the current sociological literature on arranged marriage focuses on
documenting and explaining the decline of arranged marriage, often due to ideational
diffusion and globalization (Allendorf 2013; Hoelter et al. 2004; Nedoluzhko and Agadjanian
2015; Thornton 2005; Thornton et al. 1994). Despite the widespread influence of
globalization in India, especially among the urban middle class studied in this dissertation,
there is little evidence of an increase in popularity or prevalence of love marriage (Allendorf
and Pandian 2016).
Chapter 2 focuses on the attitudes of middle class urban young adults towards
marriage, especially the choice between arranged and love marriage. It shows how stigma
and social taboos on divorce, cohabitation, love marriage, and inter-marriage make it difficult
for young people to deviate from the accepted parent-arranged model of marriage.
Interviews with young people reveal that they see marriage as fraught with serious risks,
uncertainties, and costs. They respond with an approach of marital pragmatism, framing
their marriage decisions in terms of risk management. Most young people choose arranged
marriage because it comes with an important form if insurance in the event of a “bad
marriage.” That insurance is the support that they expect to receive from their parents in
working through issues or conflicts within their marriage. These findings highlight the value
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that young people place on their relationship with parents and how this shapes their
preference for arranged marriage.
Even though young people often summarily reject love marriage in their discourse, a
closer look at marriage practices reveal significant hybridization between love and arranged
marriage. One important site for hybridization discussed in Chapter 3 is the roka marriage
engagement. The roka provides cover for young people to explore alternative marriage
scripts. For those in an arranged marriage, this often means using the engagement period to
test out the relationship through courtship. Alternatively, those who were in a pre-marital
romantic relationship use the roka engagement as a way to secure parental endorsement of
the match, a form of legitimization of their relationship within the structures of arranged
marriage. Increased prioritization of compatibility is especially evident in people’s attitudes
towards breaking off an engagement. Survey data suggests that around half of Delhi-ites are
open to breaking a roka if the couple find themselves to be incompatible. Chapter 3 suggests
that arranged marriage in India has been reconceived to incorporate elements of romantic
love, individualism, and autonomy.
The second part of this dissertation focuses on the careers and physical mobility of
married Indian women. India is a unique context to examine these topics because the
country has one of the lowest rates of female labor force participation in the world (Lahoti
and Swaminathan 2016). Furthermore, qualitative studies have suggested that the practice of
female seclusion, including the segregation and gendering of spaces, is often linked to
household social status within the Indian context (Heyer 2014; Srinivas 1952, 1956; Still
2011). As the middle class expands with India’s economic growth, many households may be
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withdrawing women from public spaces and the labor force as a way to perform their newly
achieved status. Chapter 4 uses nationally representative panel survey data to test classic
theories of how households perform status through female seclusion. Fixed effect
regressions reveal that households which experience upward economic mobility also
increased their restrictions on women’s physical mobility and were more likely to report
practicing purdah and the withdrawal of women from the labor force. These results were
primarily found in rural areas and among less educated and lower-class households. The
relationship between household economic mobility and women’s exit from the labor force
uncovered in Chapter 4 could help explain India’s low rate of female labor force
participation over the recent period of rapid economic growth.
The final chapter shifted focus to the relatively small population of dual earner
households in the urban middle class. Interviews revealed that a segment of the professional
class is rejecting the male breadwinner household model. Working women were portrayed as
better partners both because they could bring a second income to the household and also
because they are seen as more understanding of their husbands. Some people argued that
that a fulfilling companionate marriage was more easily facilitated within a dual breadwinning
relationship than in those based on gender specialization. While these findings suggest a
change in beliefs about gender roles in society, many families were not willing to consider
alternate divisions of labor within the household. Only a minority of men in dual earner
households contribute to household and care work. Many dual earner couples rely on the
labor of female family members, especially mothers-in-law, and employed domestic workers.
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Key themes
Four key themes emerged from the findings of this dissertation. These themes also suggest
important directions for future research. First, this dissertation has highlighted the central
role of the family in marriage decision-making. Even as young people gain new means of
exercising autonomy through their careers and within marriage decision-making, parents and
other extended kin continue to shape the set of viable choices for marriage and family life.
Chapter 2 shows that young people frequently prioritize their relationship with parents over
relationships with a romantic partner. Because of the central role of parents in marriage
decision-making, changes to marriage norms within a community only become possible
when parents and other senior family members change their perspectives, such as through
increased openness to love marriage. Thus, products of globalization such as Developmental
Idealism should be seen as influential primarily through how they influence parents as recent
research by Allendorf (2019) helps show. Furthermore, patrilocality also shapes the decisions
and practices of couples after marriage. Chapter 5 reveals that, after marriage, mothers-inlaw and other female kin often facilitate women’s careers by providing childcare and taking
responsibility for much of the household labor. Quotes from some women suggest that their
ability to continue their careers after marriage hinges on their ability to shore up support for
household and care work from other female household members, domestic workers, and
their husbands. Future research should not neglect the important role of parental
relationships and parental attitudes in shaping the behaviors of young people.
Second, the issue of concealment and secrecy also came forward as a central theme
in the interviews. Chapter 3 documents that betrothed couples often engage in clandestine
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meetings during their engagement, where they may explore physical intimacy and share
private details about their lives that they have hidden from their parents. Even before their
engagement, as we see in Chapter 2, many young people in the urban middle class already
have a dating history, kept secret from their parents. The secrecy with which young people
approach romantic relationships is a response to significant taboos and stigmas regarding
love marriage, dating, cohabitation, and sexuality present in Indian society (Aengst 2014;
Huang 2018; Krishnan 2021). Decisions regarding concealment and disclosure interact with
social hierarchies and kin relationships in complex ways. Individuals may disclose
information about their romantic relationship to friends, a sister-in-law, or an aunt but not to
their parents. Furthermore, parents may tacitly condone courtship during the engagement
but not explicitly discuss it.
The consequence of all of this secrecy is that much of the complexity and diversity
of relationship and marriage experiences get concealed, not only from parents but also
frequently from the researcher. The interview data suggest that partner selection practices are
often far more complex than the survey data show. Stigma can impact disclosure within both
survey and interview data. The way a question is asked, and the comfort level of the
respondent can dramatically impact responses as documented by Bell and Bishai (2021)
through examining survey para data in India. Survey data, especially on sensitive subjects
such as marriage and romantic relationships, can suffer from a social desirability bias.
Furthermore, the categories and questions used in surveys can conceal the diversity and
complexity of marriage practices. While few Indians would classify their marriage as a love
marriage because of the stigma associated with that term, a larger share may be willing to
reveal how they and their parents were involved in different stages of the decision-making
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process. Using multi-question survey prompts to gauge parental involvement, such as those
employed by Tsutsui (2013), is one direction for future survey research on arranged
marriage. There is also an important need for more qualitative work on family decisionmaking regarding arranged or joint-arranged marriage. This dissertation has provided an
important example of how qualitative methods can be used to uncover patterns of attitudes
and practices that are often hidden due to social taboos.
Relatedly, this dissertation has highlighted the performativity of many family
behaviors in India. This dissertation suggests that arranged marriage is a powerful social ideal
that symbolizes many values important to Indian families including the continuation of
tradition and respect for parents. However, the power of this social ideal is exactly what
makes it so difficult to define as almost everyone seeks the social legitimacy that the label
“arranged” brings. Chapter 3 revealed how couples in romantic relationships go to great
lengths to have their marriage plans conform to the traditions and rituals of arranged
marriage. The so-called “arranged love marriage” allows couples who selected their own
partner through dating to publicly perform the customs of arranged marriage such as the
roka ceremony. By doing so, they are attempting to signal their respect for the values
associated with arranged marriage. Performance was also an important theme of Chapter 4
which found that upwardly mobile households adopt new gendered practices as a way to
signal household status. Status through female seclusion appears to be a powerful cultural
script shaping the behavior of some populations within India. Chapter 4 highlights how
gender and social class intersect as families seek to perform a newly achieved class position
through the performance of a version of idealized femininity.
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Finally, one of the most important contributions of this dissertation has been to
center the role of precarity and risk in marriage decision-making. The young people quoted
in Chapter 2 approach marriage decision-making with pragmatism because they are
concerned about ending up stuck in a bad marriage. Much of their justification of their
marriage decisions are framed around reducing risks in marriage outcomes. Chapter 5 shows
that, within the urban middle class, men and their parents are worried about economic
instability and losing class status. The professional middle class is now primarily employed in
the private sector or self-employed which means they face greater precarity as these jobs do
not come with the job security, benefits, and pensions that previous generations of the
middle class enjoyed. In response to this precarity, some middle-class families are rejecting
the male breadwinner household model in favor of a dual earner household structure.
Furthermore, women quoted in this dissertation express fears about the risks of both love
and arranged marriage, including becoming stuck in an abusive marriage or losing key family
ties. In response they approach marriage decision-making with pragmatism and often
prioritize building an independent identity through their career. Drawing our attention
towards the role of precarity is an important contribution of this dissertation. More research
is needed on how risk and economic precarity shape family behaviors in non-Western
contexts.
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